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   This	   paper	   discusses	   the	   two	   leading	   views	   of	   history	   and	   political	  institutions.	   For	   some	   scholars,	   institutions	   are	   mainly	   products	   of	  historical	  logic,	  while	  for	  others,	  accidents,	  leaders,	  and	  decisions	  have	  a	   significant	   impact.	  We	  argue	   that	  while	   there	   is	   clear	   evidence	   that	  history	  matters	  and	  has	  long-­‐term	  effects,	  there	  is	  not	  enough	  data	  to	  help	   us	   distinguish	   between	   the	   two	   views.	   Faced	   with	   this	  uncertainty,	  what	   is	   a	   social	   scientist	   to	  do?	  We	  argue	   that	   given	   the	  possibility	   that	   policy	   decisions	   indeed	   make	   a	   difference,	   it	   makes	  sense	  to	  assume	  they	  do	  and	  to	  try	  to	  improve	  policymaking.	  	  	  	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  different	  views	  of	  political	  economy	  are	  different	  views	  of	  history.	  Of	  course,	  most	  serious	  scholars	  believe	  that	  history	  is	  important.	  However,	  there	  is	  basic	  disagreement	  about	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  history	  is	  ultimately	  deterministic.	  Is	  it	  subject	  to	  what	  Auguste	  Comte,	  arguably	  the	  father	  of	  historical	  determinism,	  called	  “invariable	  laws”?	  Or	  is	  history	  what	  Arnold	  J.	  Toynbee,	  very	  much	  a	  supporter	  of	  the	  determinist	  position,	  caricatured	  as	  “just	  one	  damned	  thing	  after	  another”—a	  series	  of	  acts	  and	  accidents,	  big	  and	  small,	  each	  playing	  out	  its	  consequences	  until	  that	  process	  gets	  interrupted	  by	  the	  next?	  If	  the	  state	  of	  the	  world	  is	  primarily	  determined	  by	  history	  and	  its	  iron	  laws,	  then	  the	  scope	  for	  policy	  reform	  is	  necessarily	  restricted	  and	  political	  economy	  becomes	  more	  about	  how	  we	  got	  here	  than	  how	  we	  can	  change	  where	  we’re	  going.	  If,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  much	  of	  what	  has	  happened	  and	  will	  happen	  is	  the	  product	  of	  happenstance,	  then	  political	  economy	  can	  play	  a	  part	  of	  the	  active	  quest	  to	  find	  the	  best	  policies	  and	  political	  
systems	  by	  helping	  us	  understand	  what	  is	  politically	  possible	  at	  each	  point	  of	  time.	  	  	  This	  paper	  begins	  with	  a	  review	  of	  the	  determinist	  and	  the	  anti-­‐determinist	  positions.	  We	  then	  observe	  that	  the	  data	  to	  discriminate	  between	  the	  two	  views	  is	  not	  only	  insufficient,	  but	  also	  unlikely	  to	  ever	  be	  sufficient.	  We	  conclude	  that	  in	  the	  interim,	  operating	  under	  the	  assumption	  that	  political	  systems	  can	  be	  made	  worse	  or	  better	  through	  design	  choices	  seems	  a	  safer	  choice.	  	  	  
1.	  Determinism	  	  To	  say	  that	  determinists	  entirely	  rule	  out	  a	  role	  for	  acts	  and	  accidents	  is	  of	  course	  a	  caricature.	  Chance	  obviously	  plays	  an	  important	  in	  determining	  the	  exact	  shape	  things	  take,	  but	  more	  importantly,	  determinists	  would	  not	  rule	  that	  the	  possibility	  that	  from	  time	  to	  time,	  certain	  cataclysmic	  events	  occur	  to	  change	  the	  destiny	  of	  nations.	  Their	  main	  point	  is	  that	  such	  events	  are	  rare	  and	  that	  even	  apparently	  large	  shocks	  like	  wars,	  decolonization	  and	  revolutions	  often	  have	  no	  more	  than	  temporary	  effects	  on	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  society—the	  names	  of	  those	  in	  power	  simply	  tend	  to	  change.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  those	  few	  truly	  epochal	  shocks	  it	  is	  the	  laws	  of	  history	  that	  decide	  what	  is	  to	  happen.	  	  	  A	  lot	  of	  what	  draws	  people	  to	  determinism	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  history	  does	  seem	  to	  have	  a	  very	  long	  reach.	  It	  would	  be	  superfluous	  to	  review	  this	  literature	  since	  there	  are	  two	  excellent	  recent	  reviews	  in	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson	  (2013)	  and	  Nunn	  (2013),	  so	  we	  confine	  ourselves	  to	  summarizing	  the	  key	  points.	  The	  contemporary	  empirical	  economics	  literature	  in	  this	  vein	  starts	  from	  the	  key	  early	  contributions	  of	  Engerman	  and	  Sokoloff	  (2000)	  who	  focus	  on	  the	  persistent	  impact	  of	  factor	  endowment	  at	  the	  time	  of	  colonization	  on	  political	  institutions	  across	  the	  Americas,	  and	  La	  Porta	  et	  al.	  (1996	  and	  1997)	  who	  observe	  that	  legal	  systems	  set	  up	  under	  colonial	  rule	  tend	  to	  persist	  and	  are	  correlated	  for	  economic	  outcomes	  today.	  	  	  
Acemoglu,	  Johnson	  and	  Robinson	  (AJR1,	  2001	  and	  AJR2,	  2002)	  take	  this	  agenda	  a	  step	  further.	  AJR1	  shows	  that,	  among	  former	  colonies,	  those	  that	  featured	  conditions	  relatively	  conducive	  to	  early	  colonialists’	  existence	  (in	  other	  words,	  places	  where	  they	  did	  not	  die	  like	  flies)	  and	  thus	  were	  settled	  by	  large	  numbers,	  had	  institutions	  put	  in	  place	  that	  were	  relatively	  inclusive	  (opposite	  of	  “extractive,”	  AJR’s	  terminology)	  that	  persisted.	  As	  a	  result	  (at	  least	  in	  their	  opinion),	  these	  countries	  have	  better	  economic	  outcomes	  several	  centuries	  later.	  AJR2	  show	  that	  the	  net	  result	  of	  this	  was	  a	  “reversal	  of	  fortunes.”	  The	  economies	  where	  the	  colonialists	  did	  not	  settle	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  the	  ones	  where	  there	  was	  a	  robust	  pre-­‐colonial	  economy,	  which	  meant	  the	  incentives	  of	  the	  colonial	  powers	  were	  clearly	  to	  set	  up	  institutions	  that	  aided	  plunder	  from	  afar.	  The	  consequence	  is	  that	  these	  economies	  are	  poorer	  today	  than	  the	  poorer	  economies	  where	  they	  settled.	  Interestingly,	  Nunn	  (2013)	  emphasizes	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  the	  areas	  that	  were	  not	  colonized	  the	  opposite	  is	  true—countries	  that	  were	  rich	  a	  long	  time	  ago	  remain	  richer	  now.	  In	  other	  words,	  both	  geography	  and	  history	  matter.	  Geography	  is	  not	  destiny—grand	  “accidents”	  like	  colonialism	  can	  turn	  poor	  countries	  into	  rich	  and	  vice	  versa,	  but	  once	  that	  happened,	  things	  can	  be	  very	  persistent	  as	  well.	  	  	  With	  their	  careful	  analysis	  of	  history	  and	  effort	  at	  better	  identification	  in	  cross-­‐country	  data,	  these	  papers	  by	  AJR	  have	  inspired	  a	  large	  literature	  that	  has	  corroborated	  the	  basic	  empirical	  claims	  of	  persistent	  effects	  of	  bad	  institutions,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  reversal	  of	  fortune.1	  For	  example	  Banerjee	  and	  Iyer	  (2005),	  present	  a	  within-­‐country	  example	  of	  such	  persistence.	  During	  British	  colonization,	  different	  districts	  in	  India	  got	  different	  systems	  of	  land-­‐revenue	  collection,	  for	  largely	  accidental	  reasons	  (mainly,	  what	  institution	  was	  chosen	  depended	  on	  the	  ideology	  of	  the	  British	  official	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  districts	  and	  the	  views	  prevalent	  in	  Britain	  at	  the	  time	  of	  conquest).	  In	  the	  zamindari	  system,	  the	  local	  landlords	  were	  given	  the	  responsibility	  for	  collecting	  land	  taxes:	  this	  served	  to	  reinforce	  their	  power	  and	  strengthen	  feudal	  relationships.	  In	  the	  alternative	  ryatwari	  system,	  farmers	  were	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Nunn	  (2013),	  as	  mentioned	  before,	  provides	  an	  excellent	  review	  of	  this	  evidence,	  though	  his	  interpretation	  of	  the	  persistence	  of	  historical	  forces	  is	  quite	  different	  from	  that	  of	  AJR.	  	  	  
individually	  responsible	  for	  their	  own	  taxes.	  These	  regions	  developed	  more	  cooperative	  and	  horizontal	  social	  relationships.	  One	  hundred	  and	  fifty	  years	  or	  more	  after	  the	  revenue	  collections	  systems	  were	  put	  in	  place,	  and	  fifty	  years	  after	  all	  they	  were	  abolished,	  the	  areas	  that	  were	  placed	  under	  elite	  domination	  continue	  to	  have	  tenser	  social	  relationships,	  lower	  agricultural	  yield,	  and	  fewer	  schools	  and	  hospitals	  than	  those	  placed	  under	  direct	  peasant	  control.	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Iyer	  (2010)	  shows	  that	  whether	  a	  particular	  area	  in	  India	  was	  placed	  under	  direct	  or	  indirect	  British	  rule	  continues	  to	  influence	  public	  good	  provision	  (though	  not	  agricultural	  yield)	  today.	  	  	  Dell	  (2010)	  explores	  the	  long-­‐term	  consequences	  of	  the	  mining	  mita,	  a	  forced	  labor	  system	  in	  place	  in	  Peru	  and	  Bolivia	  between	  1573	  and	  1812.	  Under	  the	  mita,	  200	  indigenous	  communities	  were	  required	  to	  send	  one	  seventh	  of	  their	  adult	  male	  population	  to	  work	  in	  mines.	  Using	  a	  regression	  discontinuity	  design	  strategy	  based	  on	  the	  frontier	  of	  the	  region	  under	  the	  mita,	  Dell	  shows	  that	  households	  in	  communities	  that	  had	  been	  subjected	  to	  the	  system	  are	  25%	  poorer	  today.	  Similar	  to	  Banerjee	  and	  Iyer,	  she	  hypothesizes	  that	  the	  main	  channel	  of	  this	  persistent	  effect	  is	  through	  its	  impact	  on	  land	  tenure	  and	  its	  consequences	  on	  social	  relations,	  although	  in	  this	  case	  she	  emphasizes	  the	  positive	  role	  of	  the	  zamindari-­‐like	  hacienda	  system	  that	  developed	  outside	  the	  mita	  zone—with	  property	  rights	  that	  were	  and	  remained	  secure—but	  not	  inside.	  (The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  during	  the	  mita	  period	  the	  Spanish	  government	  wanted	  to	  retain	  control	  over	  the	  labor	  force	  in	  the	  mita	  region	  and	  therefore	  did	  not	  permit	  the	  growth	  of	  haciendas,	  and	  after	  the	  mita	  ended,	  no	  system	  of	  enforceable	  peasant	  property	  right	  was	  introduced	  in	  these	  areas,	  prompting	  a	  cycle	  of	  confiscation	  and	  rebellion	  in	  the	  former	  mita	  region.)	  	  	  	  On	  the	  question	  of	  reversal	  of	  fortunes,	  Nunn	  (2008)	  shows	  that	  among	  African	  countries,	  those	  that	  were	  the	  more	  developed	  prior	  to	  the	  slave	  trades	  (measured	  by	  population	  density	  in	  1400)	  had	  the	  largest	  number	  of	  slaves	  taken	  and	  have	  the	  lowest	  incomes	  today.	  	  	  
These	  examples	  highlight	  the	  potentially	  diverse	  mechanisms	  through	  which	  bad	  institutions	  have	  long-­‐term	  effects.	  We	  now	  turn	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  broad	  theoretical	  approaches	  to	  the	  question	  of	  persistence.	  	  	  
1.1	  Economic	  determinism	  
	  Karl	  Marx	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  famous	  of	  the	  exponents	  of	  a	  purely	  economic	  theory	  of	  history.	  Marx	  does	  not	  explain	  why	  feudalism	  emerged	  only	  in	  Europe	  and	  not	  in	  Asia,	  where	  he	  posits	  an	  alternative	  “Asiatic”	  mode	  of	  production—perhaps	  that	  is	  where	  chance	  plays	  a	  role.	  However,	  starting	  from	  feudalism	  he	  argues	  for	  an	  inexorable	  path	  that	  leads	  those	  economies	  to	  capitalism	  and	  ultimately	  to	  socialism.	  The	  prime	  mover	  here	  is	  economic	  competition.	  Competition	  for	  labor	  and	  economic	  control	  between	  the	  ruling	  feudal	  lords,	  who	  live	  in	  the	  countryside	  and	  control	  farming	  around	  where	  they	  live,	  and	  the	  rising	  merchant	  class,	  which	  lives	  in	  cities	  and	  mediates	  trade	  between	  the	  many	  feudal	  domains,	  ultimately	  leads	  to	  the	  collapse	  of	  feudalism	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  capitalism.	  	  	  However	  capitalism	  is	  also	  doomed	  in	  Marx’s	  view,	  for	  more	  or	  less	  the	  same	  reason.	  Competition	  between	  capitalists	  for	  more	  labor	  and	  greater	  profits	  leads	  to	  both	  greater	  agglomeration	  of	  workers	  and	  more	  and	  more	  desperate	  attempts	  to	  further	  exploit	  them.	  The	  combination	  of	  the	  two	  ultimately	  leads	  the	  workers	  to	  form	  themselves	  into	  a	  revolutionary	  working	  class	  and	  overthrow	  capitalism,	  establishing	  socialism.	  	  These	  economic	  changes	  are	  accompanied	  by	  corresponding	  changes	  in	  other	  domains	  of	  life.	  For	  Marx,	  social	  institutions	  like	  religion	  and	  culture,	  and	  political	  institutions	  like	  democracy	  are	  by-­‐products	  of	  the	  basic	  economic	  institutions.	  “Religion,”	  as	  Marx	  famously	  observed,	  is	  “the	  opium	  of	  the	  people,”	  but	  he	  argues	  capitalism	  needs	  religion	  for	  precisely	  that	  reason—to	  dull	  the	  pain	  and	  suffering	  that	  it	  creates.	  
	  Marx’s	  approach	  to	  history	  continues	  to	  be	  very	  influential	  in	  economics,	  including	  among	  scholars	  who	  do	  not	  at	  all	  share	  Marx’s	  political	  preferences.	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson’s	  (2000)	  study	  of	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  franchise	  is	  very	  much	  in	  this	  tradition	  (though	  they	  add	  the	  key	  idea	  that	  rights	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  commitment	  device).	  In	  explaining	  the	  move	  towards	  universal	  adult	  male	  voting	  rights	  in	  the	  West,	  they	  argue	  that	  the	  elites	  had	  to	  extend	  the	  franchise	  because	  of	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  workers	  and	  the	  consequent	  rise	  in	  the	  demand	  for	  more	  redistribution.	  Faced	  with	  the	  prospect	  of	  increasing	  political	  unrest	  and	  the	  threat	  of	  revolution,	  the	  elites	  had	  to	  think	  of	  ways	  to	  commit	  themselves	  to	  greater	  redistribution	  of	  resources,	  not	  only	  in	  the	  present	  but	  also	  in	  the	  future.	  Extending	  the	  franchise	  was	  a	  way	  to	  do	  this	  credibly.	  	  Doepke	  and	  Tertilt’s	  (2009)	  argument	  for	  why	  women	  got	  the	  vote	  is	  in	  a	  similar	  vein.	  They	  argue	  that	  when	  the	  importance	  of	  human	  capital	  in	  the	  economy	  increases	  (with	  technological	  progress),	  men	  start	  to	  be	  willing	  to	  surrender	  some	  rights	  to	  women	  to	  ensure	  that	  children	  get	  better	  educated	  (the	  argument	  requires	  men	  to	  assume	  that	  women	  care	  more	  than	  themselves	  about	  children’s	  human	  capital,	  and	  that	  bargaining	  power	  matters	  for	  household	  decisions).	  The	  tradeoff	  is	  between	  their	  utility	  today,	  and	  the	  utility	  of	  their	  offspring	  (children,	  grandchildren,	  and	  future	  generations).2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Fernandez	  (2009)	  has	  a	  related,	  though	  slightly	  different	  answer	  to	  the	  same	  question:	  she	  argues	  that	  as	  fertility	  declines,	  men’s	  interest	  as	  husbands	  (who	  would	  like	  to	  have	  all	  the	  property	  and	  rights)	  starts	  to	  conflict	  with	  their	  interest	  as	  fathers	  (who	  would	  like	  to	  protect	  what	  they	  bequeath	  to	  their	  daughters	  against	  capture	  by	  their	  future	  sons-­‐in-­‐law).	  With	  economic	  growth	  and	  a	  decline	  in	  fertility,	  the	  balance	  starts	  tilting	  towards	  the	  paternal	  interest,	  and	  women’s	  economic	  and	  political	  rights	  get	  expanded.	  	  
However	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson	  diverge	  from	  Marx	  in	  one	  important	  sense.	  For	  Marx,	  progress	  was	  inevitable;	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson	  have	  a	  more	  pessimistic	  view—they	  believe	  that	  countries	  have	  a	  way	  of	  getting	  permanently	  stuck	  with	  extractive	  institutions,	  which	  are	  institutions	  that	  make	  it	  possible	  for	  a	  small	  minority	  to	  flourish	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  everyone	  else	  and	  ultimately	  the	  economy	  itself.	  The	  reason	  has	  to	  do	  with	  Robert	  Michels	  dubbed	  the	  “iron	  law	  of	  oligarchy,”	  which	  is	  the	  tendency	  of	  some	  small	  group	  to	  grab	  the	  reins	  of	  any	  organization	  (including	  entire	  nations)	  and	  then	  find	  ways	  to	  perpetuate	  itself	  in	  power.	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson	  argue	  in	  particular	  that	  political	  power	  allows	  its	  possessors	  to	  grab	  economic	  resources,	  and	  economic	  resources	  in	  turn	  facilitate	  the	  retention	  of	  political	  power,	  and	  this	  cycle	  creates	  an	  inherent	  tendency	  for	  economies	  to	  drift	  towards	  concentration	  of	  both	  economic	  and	  political	  power,	  ending	  in	  an	  oligarchic	  equilibrium	  with	  extractive	  institutions.	  Countries	  which	  start	  with	  the	  domination	  of	  an	  elite	  have	  to	  be	  very	  fortunate	  to	  have	  their	  ducks	  aligned	  in	  exactly	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  can	  escape	  this	  unfortunate	  fate	  (as	  were	  France	  and	  England).	  	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson	  see	  this	  as	  the	  basic	  reason	  why	  so	  many	  countries,	  especially	  in	  Africa	  but	  also	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  developing	  world,	  have	  not	  been	  able	  to	  sustain	  the	  democratic	  institutions	  they	  started	  with	  at	  the	  time	  of	  decolonization.	  Besley	  and	  Persson	  (2011,	  Chapter	  7,	  Table	  7.1)	  list	  the	  six	  countries	  in	  Africa	  that	  became	  independent	  after	  1945	  and	  earned	  the	  maximum	  score	  for	  “constraints	  on	  the	  executive”	  at	  the	  time	  of	  independence	  in	  the	  Polity	  IV	  database.	  Five	  years	  later,	  three	  had	  already	  lost	  it	  and	  30	  years	  later	  only	  one	  (Mauritius)	  remained	  (though	  one	  of	  them—Lesotho—returned	  to	  democracy	  in	  the	  meantime).	  	  	  	  An	  interesting	  recent	  literature	  documents	  how	  this	  process	  of	  undermining	  of	  democratic	  institutions	  happens.	  Acemoglu,	  Robinson	  and	  Santos-­‐Villagran	  (2013)	  study	  the	  paramilitaries	  in	  Colombia	  and	  argue	  that	  these	  groups	  are	  tolerated	  by	  the	  political	  system	  because	  they	  have	  a	  direct	  influence	  on	  elections	  in	  the	  zones	  they	  control,	  and	  that	  their	  power	  seems	  to	  stem	  from	  their	  ability	  to	  deliver	  votes	  
to	  some	  politicians.	  This	  creates	  a	  “symbiotic	  relationship”	  which	  sustains	  an	  oligarchic	  equilibrium	  that	  is	  difficult	  to	  escape	  from.	  	  	  In	  Sierra	  Leone,	  Acemoglu,	  Reed	  and	  Robinson	  (2013)	  document	  an	  even	  more	  localized	  instance	  of	  elite	  capture.	  They	  show	  that	  in	  places	  were	  there	  are	  few	  accepted	  “ruling”	  families	  (the	  list	  of	  these	  was	  established	  by	  the	  British	  colonial	  authorities),	  there	  is	  less	  competition	  between	  them,	  and	  those	  regions	  have	  worse	  development	  outcomes	  (education,	  child	  health,	  non-­‐agricultural	  employment,	  etc.).	  Yet	  in	  these	  regions	  participation	  is	  also	  higher	  in	  citizens’	  forums	  and	  other	  village-­‐level	  institutions	  of	  popular	  control,	  suggesting	  that	  these	  chiefs	  have	  successfully	  captured	  the	  institutions	  that	  are	  meant	  to	  control	  them.	  3	  	  An	  implication	  of	  this	  view	  is	  that	  any	  attempt	  to	  improve	  institutions	  would	  quickly	  be	  undone	  by	  the	  elites.	  Querubin	  (2011)	  provides	  an	  example	  from	  the	  Philippines,	  a	  country	  that	  tends	  to	  be	  dominated	  by	  political	  dynasties,	  some	  spanning	  several	  decades.	  More	  than	  half	  of	  elected	  congressmen	  and	  governors	  have	  a	  relative	  who	  has	  held	  elected	  office	  previously,	  and	  in	  40%	  of	  the	  79	  provinces	  the	  governor	  and	  congressman	  are	  closely	  related.4	  Querubin	  studies	  an	  attempt	  to	  curb	  the	  persistence	  of	  power,	  the	  introduction	  of	  term	  limit.	  He	  shows	  that	  at	  the	  end	  of	  a	  mandate-­‐limited	  term,	  a	  particular	  person	  is	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  in	  power,	  but	  his	  or	  her	  dynasty	  is	  not.	  Moreover,	  term	  limits	  have	  tended	  to	  discourage	  high-­‐quality	  politicians	  to	  challenge	  the	  incumbent	  until	  the	  term	  limit	  opens	  the	  field.	  This	  further	  strengthens	  incumbency,	  and	  gives	  dynasties	  even	  more	  time	  to	  build	  their	  strength	  unchallenged.	  	  	  	  
1.2	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  3	  What	  is	  striking	  in	  the	  Sierra	  Leone	  example	  is	  that	  their	  data	  was	  collected	  after	  a	  civil	  war	  that	  was	  caused	  in	  part	  by	  rebellion	  against	  the	  power	  of	  the	  chiefs.	  The	  return	  to	  peace	  was	  thus	  also	  a	  return	  to	  traditional	  structure	  of	  power.	  In	  this	  case,	  there	  was	  a	  clear	  hierarchy	  based	  on	  traditional	  elite	  status,	  age,	  and	  respect,	  and	  that	  makes	  it	  very	  difficult	  to	  challenge.	  Even	  the	  war	  was	  apparently	  insufficient.	  4	  While	  extreme,	  the	  Philippines	  is	  not	  alone	  in	  having	  political	  dynasties:	  they	  are	  found	  in	  many	  other	  countries	  in	  the	  world.	  
	  This	  growing	  evidence	  supports	  the	  idea	  that	  something	  in	  the	  way	  countries	  work	  is	  remarkably	  stable.	  Dramatic	  historical	  accidents	  such	  as	  discovery	  and	  	  colonization	  -­‐-­‐or	  rare	  instances	  of	  revolutions-­‐-­‐	  may	  change	  the	  course	  of	  history,	  but	  generally	  something	  governing	  human	  behavior	  has	  a	  tendency	  to	  persist	  through	  apparently	  major	  changes	  (such	  as	  de-­‐colonization,	  introduction	  of	  democratic	  governments,	  etc.).	  	  	  An	  alternative	  to	  economic	  determinism	  is	  to	  emphasize	  the	  importance	  of	  culture.	  Culture	  is	  shaped	  by	  major	  events	  and	  circumstances,	  but	  moves	  very	  slowly	  and	  continues	  to	  affect	  human	  relations	  long	  after	  the	  factors	  that	  made	  it	  the	  way	  it	  is	  are	  long	  forgotten.	  A	  remarkable	  example	  of	  such	  persistence	  is	  in	  Nunn	  (2008),	  mentioned	  above.	  He	  shows	  that	  regions	  in	  Africa	  which	  sent	  more	  slaves	  are	  still	  poorer	  today.	  Similarly	  to	  AJR2,	  he	  notes	  that	  this	  cannot	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  were	  poorer	  regions	  to	  start	  with,	  since	  the	  regions	  that	  were	  initially	  richer	  were	  more	  subjected	  to	  the	  slave	  trade.	  He	  also	  shows	  that	  those	  regions	  had	  worse	  institutions	  post	  slavery	  (and	  before	  colonization).	  	  	  In	  subsequent	  work,	  Nunn	  and	  Wantchekon	  (2011)	  explore	  potential	  causal	  channels	  behind	  this	  persistence,	  and	  hypothesize	  that	  cultural	  norms	  of	  behavior	  may	  be	  at	  play.	  They	  observe	  that	  levels	  of	  people’s	  trust	  in	  relatives,	  neighbors	  and	  government	  are	  lower	  today	  in	  regions	  were	  the	  slave	  trade	  was	  more	  active.	  They	  try	  to	  decompose	  this	  effect	  into	  one	  running	  through	  institutions	  that	  help	  sustains	  trust,	  and	  one	  coming	  from	  the	  level	  of	  trust	  conditional	  on	  such	  institutions.	  They	  find	  that	  both	  channels	  are	  at	  play,	  but	  that	  the	  latter	  seem	  to	  be	  quantitatively	  twice	  as	  important	  as	  the	  former.	  Pierce	  and	  Snyder	  (2012)	  add	  teeth	  to	  this	  argument	  by	  demonstrating	  a	  causal	  mechanism	  linking	  trust	  to	  economic	  fortunes.	  They	  observe	  that	  in	  regions	  where	  the	  slave	  trade	  was	  more	  active,	  firms	  today	  have	  more	  difficulties	  obtaining	  financing.	  	  	  	  
Like	  economic	  determinism,	  cultural	  determinism	  has	  a	  long	  tradition.	  Weber	  (1930)	  is	  probably	  the	  most	  famous	  exposition	  of	  the	  defining	  role	  of	  culture	  (in	  its	  particular	  expression	  as	  religion).	  With	  its	  emphasis	  on	  hard	  work	  and	  depiction	  of	  economic	  success	  as	  its	  own	  reward,	  Protestantism	  promoted	  a	  culture	  of	  entrepreneurship,	  which	  according	  to	  Weber,	  was	  central	  in	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  capitalist	  economy	  and	  the	  industrial	  revolution.	  	  	  Religion	  can	  also	  partly	  explain	  the	  diverse	  impact	  of	  colonization	  on	  future	  outcomes.	  Several	  studies	  link	  differences	  in	  missionary	  activities	  across	  and	  within	  countries	  and	  outcomes	  today	  (see	  Nunn,	  2013	  for	  a	  detailed	  review),	  finding	  both	  direct	  effects	  of	  missionary	  activities,	  and	  differences	  between	  the	  long-­‐term	  impacts	  of	  different	  Protestant	  and	  Catholic	  orders.	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Botticini	  and	  Eckstein	  (2005)	  argue	  that	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  second	  temple	  by	  the	  Romans	  had	  a	  fundamental	  influence	  on	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Jewish	  community.	  By	  transforming	  Judaism	  from	  a	  sacrifice-­‐based	  religion	  to	  one	  where	  every	  male	  child	  was	  required	  to	  read	  the	  Torah,	  this	  promoted	  literacy	  in	  the	  community,	  which	  had	  far-­‐reaching	  impacts	  in	  terms	  of	  economic	  development.	  	  	  Greif’s	  (1994)	  work	  comparing	  the	  Maghribi	  and	  the	  Genoese	  traders	  further	  illustrates	  how	  culture	  affects	  institutions.	  The	  Genoese	  traders	  had	  an	  individualist	  culture,	  which	  required	  them	  to	  develop	  a	  robust	  system	  of	  contract	  and	  contractual	  enforcement.	  The	  Maghribi	  relied	  on	  collective	  punishments	  for	  cheating	  and	  therefore	  did	  not	  require	  formal	  systems	  of	  enforcement	  arrangements.	  This	  was	  initially	  an	  advantage	  when	  trade	  was	  relatively	  limited,	  but	  eventually	  turned	  into	  a	  liability	  because	  the	  collectivist	  system	  did	  not	  easily	  extend	  to	  enable	  trade	  with	  people	  the	  Maghribis	  did	  not	  know	  or	  to	  larger	  communities.	  	  	  Recent	  work	  by	  Aghion,	  Algan,	  Cahuc,	  and	  Shleifer	  (2010)	  emphasizes	  this	  interplay	  between	  culture	  and	  institutions:	  low	  civic-­‐mindedness	  leads	  to	  a	  greater	  need	  for	  government	  regulation,	  but	  that	  in	  turn	  reduces	  the	  need	  for	  social	  capital	  accumulation	  and	  norms	  of	  cooperation	  and	  good	  behavior.	  This	  can	  lead	  to	  
multiple	  steady	  states,	  where	  culture	  and	  institutions	  co-­‐evolve,	  and	  Aghion	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  do	  find	  a	  negative	  cross-­‐country	  relationship	  between	  levels	  of	  trust	  and	  level	  of	  government	  regulations.	  	  	  Of	  course,	  the	  causality	  need	  not	  always	  run	  from	  culture	  to	  the	  rest.	  Indeed,	  the	  example	  of	  slavery	  shows	  that	  institutions	  affect	  culture.	  Another	  example	  is	  suggested	  by	  Tabelini	  (2010),	  who	  shows	  a	  significant	  relationship	  between	  cultural	  traits	  today	  (trust,	  confidence,	  respect	  of	  effort,	  etc.)	  and	  institutions	  in	  the	  17th-­‐19th	  centuries	  in	  Europe.	  	  
2.	  Persistence	  without	  determinism	  
	  Persistence	  does	  not	  have	  to	  mean	  determinism.	  In	  other	  words,	  things	  might	  be	  slow	  to	  change,	  not	  because	  there	  is	  some	  fundamental	  force	  like	  economic	  power	  or	  culture	  bringing	  things	  back	  to	  place,	  but	  because	  of	  the	  innate	  difficulty	  getting	  anything	  at	  the	  scale	  of	  nations	  to	  change	  drastically.	  Persistence	  could	  reflect	  the	  difficulty	  of	  coordination,	  the	  problem	  of	  aligning	  beliefs	  and	  expectations	  across	  large	  populations,	  the	  challenge	  of	  getting	  very	  large	  numbers	  of	  people	  to	  rethink	  the	  way	  they	  are	  used	  to	  behaving.	  	  	  A	  somewhat	  extreme	  but	  interesting	  example	  of	  such	  a	  coordination	  difficulty	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  perpetual	  civil	  conflict.	  Collier	  (2008)	  emphasizes	  that	  most	  of	  the	  
Bottom	  Billion	  people	  in	  the	  world	  live	  in	  countries	  afflicted	  by	  ongoing	  or	  recently	  concluded	  civil	  wars.	  One	  reason	  these	  wars	  persist	  is	  because	  neither	  side	  trusts	  the	  other	  to	  behave	  in	  a	  post-­‐truce	  equilibrium—basically	  what	  is	  to	  stop	  you	  from	  turning	  around	  and	  shooting	  me	  the	  moment	  I	  lay	  down	  my	  arms?	  	  	  However,	  in	  a	  world	  where	  there	  is	  so	  much	  mistrust	  between	  groups,	  peace	  may	  not	  be	  much	  better.	  A	  simple	  but	  insightful	  theoretical	  paper	  by	  Padro-­‐i-­‐Miguel	  (2007)	  makes	  this	  point.	  In	  his	  model,	  there	  are	  two	  ethnic	  groups.	  Both	  groups	  know	  that	  their	  leaders	  are	  corrupt,	  but	  having	  a	  corrupt	  leader	  from	  the	  other	  
group	  is	  worse	  than	  having	  a	  corrupt	  leader	  from	  your	  own.	  In	  such	  a	  situation	  the	  group	  currently	  in	  power	  may	  prefer	  to	  tolerate	  its	  own	  corrupt	  leader	  because	  the	  process	  of	  toppling	  the	  leader	  creates	  instability,	  and	  instability	  allows	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  other	  group	  taking	  over.	  	  	  This	  kind	  of	  ongoing	  civil	  conflict	  is	  horrible	  for	  those	  who	  have	  to	  live	  through	  it,	  however	  it	  does	  offer	  more	  policy	  options	  than	  we	  would	  have	  had	  in	  a	  world	  of	  strong	  determinism,	  because	  it	  is	  in	  everyone’s	  interest	  to	  get	  out	  of	  the	  mess.	  Therefore	  the	  external	  intervention	  required	  to	  get	  things	  going	  could	  be	  small	  relative	  to	  size	  of	  the	  potential	  gains.	  This	  is	  what	  makes	  Collier	  favor	  interventions	  in	  troubled	  states,	  including	  military	  interventions.	  Examples	  of	  such	  types	  of	  intervention	  that	  have	  been	  tried	  in	  recent	  years,	  sometimes	  quite	  successfully,	  include	  efforts	  to	  reduce	  the	  benefits	  of	  winning	  the	  civil	  war	  by	  making	  it	  harder	  for	  the	  victors	  to	  expropriate	  the	  country’s	  natural	  resources,	  and	  inviting	  in	  UN	  Peacekeeping	  Operations	  as	  a	  way	  to	  guarantee	  that	  the	  treaty	  terms	  are	  respected.	  	  	  
2.1	  Leaders	  matter	  
	  One	  of	  the	  central	  implications	  of	  this	  more	  contingent	  view	  of	  history	  is	  that	  leaders	  will	  matter.	  Good	  leaders	  can	  provide	  coordination	  where	  there	  is	  discord	  and	  direction	  where	  there	  is	  drift.	  The	  example	  of	  the	  resurgent	  Brazil	  of	  recent	  years,	  with	  the	  important	  role	  apparently	  played	  by	  President	  Lula	  in	  creating	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  coalition	  and	  sustaining	  it,	  is	  often	  adduced	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  how	  important	  leaders	  can	  be.	  By	  contrast,	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson	  (2012,	  2013)	  emphasize	  the	  example	  of	  K.A.	  Busia,	  prime	  minister	  of	  Ghana	  1969-­‐72,	  who	  despite	  his	  best	  intentions	  and	  adherence	  external	  advice	  was	  unable	  to	  implement	  good	  policies	  due	  to	  the	  political	  pressures	  he	  faced.	  When	  he	  tried,	  he	  was	  ousted	  and	  the	  country	  fell	  into	  violent	  conflict,	  an	  example	  of	  the	  pervser	  direction	  a	  country	  can	  take	  despite	  a	  good	  leader.	  	  	  
Jones	  and	  Olken	  (2005)	  provide	  some	  empirical	  evidence	  that,	  in	  practice,	  leaders	  do	  actually	  matter	  quite	  a	  bit.	  This	  is	  a	  difficult	  question	  to	  tackle,	  since	  leadership	  transitions	  are	  not	  exogenous,	  and	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  happen	  when	  things	  go	  poorly.	  Jones	  and	  Olken	  gain	  some	  traction	  on	  the	  problem	  by	  looking	  at	  transitions	  caused	  by	  the	  death	  of	  politicians	  while	  in	  office,	  either	  due	  to	  natural	  causes	  or	  accidents.5	  They	  argue	  that	  in	  these	  cases,	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  transition	  from	  one	  leader	  to	  the	  next	  is	  largely	  exogenous.	  Using	  57	  such	  transitions,	  they	  estimate	  that	  one	  standard	  deviation	  improvement	  in	  leader	  quality	  results	  in	  1.5%	  increase	  in	  growth	  each	  year.	  They	  also	  find	  evidence	  that	  these	  effects	  are	  larger	  in	  autocracies	  and	  when	  leaders	  face	  few	  constraints	  on	  their	  authority,	  and	  nonexistent	  in	  democracies.	  This	  fits	  well	  with	  the	  traditional	  political	  agency	  view—where	  leaders	  in	  democracies	  do	  what	  the	  median	  voter	  wants,	  but	  dictators	  do	  what	  they	  themselves	  want—and	  not	  so	  well	  with	  the	  view	  that	  unconstrained	  leaders	  reflect	  bad	  institutions,	  because	  countries	  with	  bad	  institutions	  will	  have	  poor	  outcomes	  regardless	  of	  who	  leads.	  	  	  	  	  
2.2	  Formal	  rules	  can	  make	  a	  difference	  	  Formal	  rules	  do	  not	  matter	  in	  a	  deterministic	  world	  except	  in	  as	  much	  as	  they	  are	  purely	  expressions	  of	  the	  direction	  favored	  by	  the	  extant	  culture	  or	  the	  elite	  in	  power.	  Where	  things	  are	  more	  fluid,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  they	  can	  make	  a	  big	  difference.	  	  	  There	  are	  recent	  examples	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  formal	  political	  rules.	  In	  India,	  women	  have	  traditionally	  been	  substantially	  underrepresented	  in	  politics,	  undoubtedly	  reflecting	  the	  strong	  cultural	  prejudice	  against	  women	  doing	  “men’s	  jobs”	  (although	  there	  have	  been	  several	  examples	  of	  powerful	  women	  at	  the	  national	  or	  state	  level).	  However,	  the	  73rd	  amendment	  of	  the	  Indian	  Constitution	  adopted	  in	  1992	  required	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  In	  subsequent	  work,	  Jones	  and	  Olken	  (2009)	  study	  the	  impact	  of	  political	  assassinations.	  
that	  a	  third	  of	  the	  seats	  in	  the	  lowest	  level	  of	  rural	  government,	  should	  be	  reserved	  for	  women.	  When	  this	  law	  passed	  it	  was	  met	  with	  a	  lot	  of	  skepticism:	  detractors	  felt	  that	  given	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  prejudices,	  women	  would	  just	  end	  up	  standing	  as	  their	  husbands’	  puppets	  (an	  extremely	  local	  version	  of	  the	  elite	  capture	  argument!).	  Chattopadhyay	  and	  Duflo	  (2005)	  show	  that	  this	  is	  not	  true.	  They	  exploit	  the	  random	  assignment	  of	  these	  reserved	  seats	  to	  show	  that	  women	  leaders	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  enact	  policies	  that	  closely	  reflect	  women’s	  preferences.	  Moreover,	  the	  leaders’	  influence	  goes	  beyond	  the	  allocation	  of	  public	  goods	  while	  they	  are	  in	  power.	  Using	  the	  same	  source	  of	  variation,	  Beaman	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  show	  that	  the	  allocation	  of	  public	  resources	  towards	  goods	  preferred	  by	  women	  persists	  even	  after	  women	  have	  left	  power.	  Bhavnani	  (2009)	  and	  Beaman	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  show	  that	  women	  continue	  to	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  elected	  in	  constituencies	  that	  have	  been	  reserved	  women	  after	  the	  villages	  have	  been	  rotated	  out	  of	  reservation.	  This	  is	  not	  generally	  due	  to	  the	  same	  woman	  being	  reelected,	  so	  it	  is	  not	  an	  instance	  of	  a	  new	  elite	  being	  formed.	  Using	  implicit	  association	  tests	  and	  political	  vignettes,	  Beaman	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  further	  show	  that	  this	  is	  due	  in	  part	  to	  an	  improved	  perception	  of	  the	  competence	  of	  women	  leaders	  among	  men.	  Finally	  Beaman	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  show	  that	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  village	  that	  come	  from	  the	  experience	  of	  a	  having	  female	  leaders	  can	  be	  profound.	  They	  show	  that	  in	  villages	  that	  have	  been	  (randomly)	  reserved	  for	  women	  for	  at	  least	  two	  terms,	  the	  aspirations	  of	  parents	  for	  their	  teenage	  girls—as	  well	  as	  the	  aspirations	  of	  the	  girls	  for	  themselves—become	  closer	  to	  those	  for	  boys.	  Strikingly,	  this	  also	  affects	  the	  actual	  educational	  attainment	  of	  the	  girls	  (even	  though	  the	  leaders	  have	  no	  direct	  control	  of	  the	  school	  system).	  	  	  Beath	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  also	  find	  that	  mandated	  female	  participation	  in	  community	  activities	  impacts	  attitudes	  towards	  women	  in	  Afghanistan,	  famously	  a	  country	  with	  strong	  traditionalist	  views	  regarding	  women.	  They	  analyze	  a	  randomized	  experiment	  in	  500	  villages	  in	  Afghanistan	  to	  measure	  the	  impact	  of	  adding	  special	  provisions	  aimed	  at	  promoting	  gender	  equality	  to	  a	  program	  of	  block	  grants	  for	  villages.	  The	  provisions	  required	  a	  gender-­‐balanced	  village	  development	  council,	  equal	  participation	  of	  men	  and	  women	  in	  the	  elections	  of	  the	  council	  and	  in	  the	  
selection	  of	  development	  projects,	  and	  that	  at	  least	  one	  project	  was	  prioritized	  by	  women.	  These	  requirements	  were	  imposed	  in	  randomly	  chosen	  villages.	  The	  study	  found	  that	  not	  all	  dimensions	  of	  the	  role	  of	  women	  were	  affected	  by	  those	  requirements	  (there	  was,	  for	  example,	  no	  change	  in	  attitude	  regarding	  the	  role	  of	  women	  in	  society);	  however	  some	  things	  did	  change:	  there	  was	  an	  increase	  in	  female	  participation	  in	  community	  decision-­‐making	  (i.e.	  the	  rules	  were	  followed	  de	  facto	  and	  were	  not	  just	  de	  jure)	  and	  also	  in	  production	  activities.	  The	  support	  for	  female	  participation	  in	  collective	  decision-­‐making	  also	  increased.	  	  	  So,	  the	  role	  of	  women	  in	  decision-­‐making	  was	  improved	  by	  a	  mandate	  externally	  imposed	  by	  a	  donor	  that	  was	  also	  an	  invader—in	  Afghanistan,	  which	  seems,	  in	  many	  other	  respects,	  a	  tough	  nut	  to	  crack.	  This	  must	  raise	  some	  doubts	  about	  the	  immutability	  of	  cultural	  prejudices	  and	  the	  historical	  structures	  of	  power.	  	  	  
2.3	  Small	  accidents	  can	  have	  big	  effects	  	  In	  the	  previous	  instances,	  the	  policies	  were	  actually	  intended	  to	  increase	  the	  influence	  of	  women,	  and	  we	  see	  that	  they	  did.	  However,	  in	  many	  other	  cases	  policies	  end	  up	  being	  different	  for	  mostly	  accidental	  reasons.	  In	  a	  determinist	  world	  we	  would	  expect	  these	  changes	  to	  be	  reversed	  or	  rendered	  inconsequential—unless	  they	  were	  huge	  accidents	  like	  being	  colonized—but	  in	  a	  world	  where	  policies	  are	  created	  in	  a	  much	  more	  haphazard	  way,	  we	  can	  imagine	  the	  unintended	  consequences	  of	  these	  policies	  being	  quite	  substantial.	  	  Dell	  (2012)	  gives	  us	  an	  interesting	  example—a	  relatively	  modest	  event,	  which,	  because	  of	  its	  timing,	  ended	  up	  having	  long-­‐term	  consequences.	  She	  demonstrates	  that	  in	  Mexico,	  regions	  that	  were	  more	  affected	  by	  a	  drought	  in	  the	  years	  1907-­‐1910	  (generally	  a	  drought	  period	  in	  Mexico)	  had	  more	  insurgency	  during	  the	  years	  of	  the	  Mexican	  Revolution	  1910	  to	  1918,	  and	  therefore	  greater	  demand	  for	  land	  redistribution.	  To	  respond	  to	  these	  demands,	  during	  the	  last	  years	  of	  the	  Revolution,	  more	  land	  was	  redistributed	  in	  these	  areas.	  Redistribution	  took	  the	  form	  of	  ejidos,	  a	  
system	  whereby	  peasants	  are	  granted	  usage	  rights	  on	  a	  property	  that	  is	  collectively	  held.	  The	  ejido	  system	  is	  both	  a	  central	  mechanism	  for	  land	  redistribution	  and,	  increasingly,	  an	  instrument	  of	  patronage	  politics.	  What	  Dell	  shows	  is	  that	  regions	  which	  were	  more	  affected	  by	  the	  drought	  in	  the	  early	  part	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  and	  thus	  more	  insurgence,	  are	  still	  significantly	  poorer	  today.6	  She	  attributes	  this	  to	  the	  higher	  fraction	  of	  ejido	  in	  those	  regions,	  and	  hence	  a	  stronger	  grip	  of	  patronage	  politics	  and	  weaker	  property	  rights,	  which	  ended	  up	  being	  a	  barrier	  to	  industrialization.	  Dell’s	  paper	  emphasizes	  the	  glass-­‐half-­‐empty	  result,	  which	  is	  that	  even	  a	  relatively	  small	  drought	  can	  put	  regions	  onto	  a	  permanently	  lower	  growth	  path.	  But	  the	  positive	  interpretation	  is	  just	  as	  interesting	  in	  this	  case:	  despite	  all	  the	  problems	  of	  Mexico,	  all	  it	  took	  for	  some	  regions	  to	  escape	  some	  of	  the	  endemic	  political	  debacle	  of	  the	  country	  was	  good	  weather	  in	  the	  early	  part	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  	  	  Hornbeck	  and	  Naidu	  (2012)	  study	  another	  temporary	  climatic	  accident	  with	  long-­‐run	  consequences,	  the	  flood	  of	  the	  Mississippi	  river	  in	  1927.	  In	  this	  instance,	  unlike	  in	  the	  Mexican	  case,	  the	  regions	  that	  were	  the	  most	  affected	  by	  a	  negative	  event	  ended	  up	  doing	  better.	  The	  authors	  compare	  the	  trajectory	  of	  counties	  that	  were	  flooded	  to	  nearby	  counties	  that	  were	  not.	  After	  the	  flood,	  there	  were	  widespread	  abuses	  by	  white	  famers	  at	  refugee	  camps	  set	  up	  for	  those	  affected.	  This	  prompted	  a	  large	  outmigration	  of	  black	  farm	  workers	  and	  sharecroppers	  who	  never	  came	  back,	  effectively	  breaking	  up	  the	  traditional	  patron-­‐client	  relationship	  between	  whites	  and	  blacks.	  This	  forced	  the	  white	  farmers	  in	  those	  regions	  to	  modernize	  agriculture	  and	  increase	  capital	  intensity,	  since	  they	  could	  not	  rely	  on	  cheap	  labor	  anymore.	  In	  1970,	  affected	  regions	  were	  considerably	  more	  mechanized	  than	  non-­‐affected	  regions,	  but	  land	  values	  were	  not	  affected,	  suggesting	  that	  was	  not	  a	  land-­‐equality	  effect	  that	  raised	  wages	  but	  rather	  the	  shift	  to	  a	  different	  equilibrium	  with	  higher	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  She	  does	  not	  report	  the	  reduced	  form	  estimate	  of	  drought	  on	  income	  today,	  but	  the	  instrumental	  variable	  estimate	  (with	  rainfall	  as	  instrument)	  implies	  that	  municipalities	  which,	  for	  this	  exogenous	  reason,	  had	  some	  insurgent	  activities	  are	  30%	  poorer	  today	  than	  those	  that	  did	  not.	  	  
wages	  and	  mechanization,	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  black	  exodus	  promoted	  by	  the	  flood	  experience.	  	  	  	  
2.4	  The	  (beneficial)	  effects	  of	  fighting	  wars	  
	  In	  several	  important	  books	  and	  papers,	  Besley	  and	  Persson	  make	  the	  point	  that	  wars	  are	  a	  particularly	  interesting	  example	  of	  a	  temporary	  shock	  that	  has	  long-­‐term	  consequences.7	  Their	  primary	  interest	  is	  in	  the	  role	  of	  fiscal	  capacity	  in	  development.	  All	  countries	  that	  are	  developed	  today	  have	  managed	  to	  form	  fiscal	  apparatuses	  to	  raise	  enough	  taxes	  to	  provide	  public	  goods	  and	  to	  redistribute.	  They	  are	  able	  to	  do	  so,	  in	  Besley	  and	  Persson’s	  view,	  because	  the	  nations	  have	  agreed-­‐upon	  goals	  and	  institutional	  constraints	  concerning	  what	  the	  money	  can	  be	  spent	  on.	  	  	  	  In	  their	  basic	  model,	  Besley	  and	  Persson	  have	  in	  mind	  a	  world	  where	  there	  are	  two	  groups	  and	  two	  time	  periods.	  In	  the	  first	  period	  one	  of	  the	  two	  groups	  is	  in	  power.	  This	  group	  can	  raise	  funds	  and	  use	  them	  to	  spend	  on	  public	  goods	  or	  redistribution	  towards	  some	  group	  (including,	  obviously,	  their	  own).	  They	  can	  also,	  at	  a	  cost,	  invest	  in	  fiscal	  capacity,	  which	  will	  allow	  them	  to	  raise	  more	  funds	  both	  in	  this	  period	  and	  the	  next	  (whoever	  happens	  to	  be	  in	  power	  next	  period).	  Depending	  on	  parameters’	  values,	  a	  country	  can	  end	  up	  in	  a	  “common-­‐interest	  state”	  where	  current	  and	  future	  revenues	  are	  mainly	  expected	  to	  be	  used	  in	  the	  common	  interest,	  a	  “redistributive	  state”	  where	  resources	  will	  be	  redistributed	  to	  the	  group	  in	  power	  and	  the	  government	  will	  invest	  in	  fiscal	  capacity	  if	  they	  expect	  to	  be	  in	  power	  in	  period	  two	  (and	  therefore	  continue	  to	  enjoy	  the	  redistribution),	  or	  a	  “weak	  state”	  where	  political	  instability	  is	  high	  and	  no	  incumbent	  invests	  in	  fiscal	  capacity.	  This	  model	  is	  then	  extended	  to	  take	  into	  account	  legal	  capacity	  (this	  includes	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  We	  rely	  on	  their	  book,	  Pillars	  of	  Prosperity	  (2011),	  as	  well	  as	  Besley	  and	  Persson	  (2008,	  2009,	  2010	  and	  2013).	  	  	  
protection	  of	  property	  rights	  against	  predation	  both	  by	  other	  private	  individuals	  and	  by	  the	  state).	  	  	  The	  key	  question	  for	  Besley	  and	  Persson	  is	  how	  a	  country	  ends	  up	  with	  a	  common-­‐interest	  state.	  External	  wars	  are	  important	  for	  them	  as	  critical	  factor	  in	  creating	  common	  goals.	  Pursuing	  this	  hypothesis	  in	  a	  cross	  section	  of	  countries,	  they	  find	  that	  the	  ones	  that	  have	  faced	  more	  wars	  in	  the	  past	  do	  indeed	  have	  both	  a	  greater	  share	  of	  taxes	  in	  the	  GDP	  and	  stronger	  protection	  of	  property	  rights.	  Besley	  and	  Persson	  (2013)	  emphasize	  one	  specific	  but	  telling	  example	  by	  examining	  data	  from	  47	  countries	  about	  the	  introduction	  of	  direct	  withholding	  of	  taxes	  from	  wages	  (a	  discrete	  investment	  in	  fiscal	  capacity).	  	  They	  show	  that	  the	  19	  countries	  that	  participated	  in	  WWII	  were	  more	  likely	  than	  the	  rest	  to	  have	  direct	  withholding	  in	  place	  after	  1945,	  whereas	  they	  were	  equally	  likely	  to	  have	  had	  it	  before	  the	  war.	  	  	  On	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum,	  states	  that	  have	  easy	  access	  to	  resources	  (either	  natural	  resources	  or	  foreign	  aid)	  have	  limited	  incentives	  to	  invest	  in	  fiscal	  capacity.	  This	  is	  what	  Besley	  and	  Persson	  contend	  was	  the	  key	  problem	  with	  a	  lot	  of	  newly	  independent	  African	  states.	  The	  effect	  was	  heightened	  by	  the	  facts	  that	  the	  Cold	  War	  superpowers	  were	  happy	  to	  be	  generous	  with	  aid	  (especially	  military)—which	  obviously	  strengthened	  the	  hand	  of	  the	  African	  leaders	  currently	  in	  power—and	  that	  many	  of	  these	  leaders	  had	  emerged	  from	  the	  independence	  movement	  and	  therefore	  started	  out	  with	  a	  lot	  of	  support.	  These	  leaders	  neither	  invested	  in	  fiscal	  capacity	  nor	  in	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  or	  other	  cohesive	  institutions	  (Besley-­‐Persson’s	  term)	  that	  would	  force	  them	  to	  share	  the	  rents	  available	  to	  them.	  	  However,	  this	  left	  the	  excluded	  groups	  with	  little	  choice	  but	  to	  revolt,	  and	  eventually	  many	  of	  these	  countries	  ended	  up	  with	  insurgencies,	  repression	  and	  often	  outright	  civil	  wars.	  The	  instability	  thus	  created	  further	  discouraged	  investment	  in	  fiscal	  capacity	  since	  the	  current	  decision-­‐makers	  were	  no	  longer	  sure	  they	  would	  be	  around	  to	  enjoy	  the	  fruits.	  However,	  it	  may	  also	  ultimately	  have	  set	  off	  a	  more	  salubrious	  dynamic.	  Instability	  gives	  those	  currently	  in	  power	  incentive	  to	  set	  up	  
institutions	  that	  will	  protect	  their	  access	  to	  public	  resources	  even	  when	  they	  are	  out	  of	  power—in	  other	  words,	  there	  is	  some	  incentive	  to	  move	  towards	  more	  cohesive	  institutions.	  In	  support	  of	  this	  view	  they	  cite	  the	  result	  in	  Jones	  and	  Olken	  (2009)	  who	  compare	  countries	  that	  had	  successful	  and	  unsuccessful	  assassination	  attempts	  on	  the	  leader	  and	  show	  that	  successful	  assassinations	  are	  often	  followed	  by	  civil	  war	  and	  a	  period	  of	  instability,	  but	  also	  that	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  a	  transition	  to	  democracy.	  Besley	  and	  Persson	  interpret	  this	  as	  showing	  that	  instability	  promotes	  a	  move	  towards	  more	  cohesive	  institutions	  and	  therefore	  less	  instability	  and	  stronger	  incentives	  to	  invest	  in	  fiscal	  capacity.	  	  Interestingly,	  their	  data	  shows	  a	  reduction	  in	  both	  civil	  wars	  and	  repression,	  starting	  in	  the	  late	  1980s.	  Taken	  together,	  this	  offers	  a	  more	  contingent	  (less	  determinist)	  and	  ultimately	  more	  optimistic	  interpretation	  of	  what	  happened	  in	  Africa	  in	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  era.	  We	  might	  ask,	  for	  example,	  whether	  things	  would	  have	  been	  different	  had	  there	  been	  no	  Cold	  War.	  	  	  
3.	  A	  perspective	  on	  political	  economy?	  	  
	  Where	  does	  all	  of	  this	  leave	  us?	  Does	  history	  mainly	  roll	  forth	  following	  its	  own	  powerful	  logic,	  liable	  to	  be	  knocked	  off	  that	  course	  only	  by	  some	  massive	  shock	  to	  the	  system?	  Or	  is	  there	  a	  lot	  that	  is	  left	  undermined	  by	  these	  grand	  forces	  and	  therefore	  up	  for	  grabs?	  Can	  we	  or	  can	  we	  not	  make	  our	  own	  history?	  The	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  is	  central	  to	  our	  perspective	  on	  policy—if	  history	  is	  determinant,	  our	  interventions	  can	  be	  useless	  or	  even	  counterproductive.	  	  	  Unfortunately,	  like	  many	  important	  questions,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  this	  one	  admits	  an	  unambiguous	  answer.	  All	  the	  evidence	  we	  reviewed	  in	  this	  paper	  suggests	  a	  strong	  (and	  persistent)	  role	  for	  historical	  events	  in	  shaping	  institutions	  and	  political	  and	  economic	  phenomena.	  But	  as	  we	  pointed	  out	  earlier,	  there	  is	  a	  key	  difference	  between	  the	  views	  that	  insist	  on	  historical	  determinism	  and	  views	  that	  emphasizes	  more	  the	  co-­‐existence	  of	  different	  potential	  equilibria	  that	  are	  more	  or	  less	  “on	  a	  
flat,”	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  where	  those	  societies	  end	  up	  is	  partly	  a	  result	  of	  some	  fleeting	  pieces	  of	  good	  or	  bad	  luck,	  and	  partly	  a	  result	  of	  choices	  that	  people	  made	  under	  no	  strong	  compulsion	  from	  history	  or	  culture	  or	  institutions.	  	  	  To	  illustrate	  the	  problem,	  consider	  the	  case	  mentioned	  earlier,	  where	  the	  purely	  accidental	  fact	  of	  flooding	  in	  1927	  had	  persistent	  impact	  on	  the	  social	  and	  labor	  market	  equilibrium	  of	  a	  particular	  county	  in	  the	  South	  and	  the	  organization	  of	  production.	  The	  historical	  account	  given	  by	  Hornbeck	  and	  Naidu—which	  emphasizes	  the	  poor	  treatment	  of	  blacks	  in	  refugee	  camps	  and	  the	  ensuing	  shift	  in	  the	  attitude	  of	  black	  leadership	  regarding	  migration—is	  certainly	  consistent	  with	  an	  explanation	  in	  terms	  of	  fragile	  social	  equilibria	  that	  can	  easily	  be	  shifted,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  prove	  that	  such	  shocks	  happen	  often.	  It	  could	  also	  be	  that	  such	  accidents	  only	  matter	  when	  society	  is	  close	  to	  a	  tipping	  point	  anyway,	  and	  that	  the	  floods	  would	  not	  have	  caused	  any	  major	  change	  in	  the	  South	  if	  they	  had	  come	  earlier	  or	  later,	  or	  not	  taken	  place	  in	  the	  US	  where	  there	  was	  a	  possible	  escape	  route	  for	  the	  black	  population.	  	  	  Conversely,	  the	  evidence	  that	  extractive	  institutions	  tend	  to	  persist	  and	  be	  correlated	  with	  economic	  performance,	  even	  through	  nominal	  changes	  of	  governments	  and	  formal	  institutions	  ,	  is	  also	  based	  on	  relatively	  little	  effective	  data.	  AJR1	  and	  AJR2	  present	  a	  cross-­‐country	  regression	  in	  a	  sample	  of	  former	  colonies,	  and	  do	  indeed	  show	  strong	  persistence	  of	  institutions	  and	  large	  impacts	  on	  growth.	  But	  they	  are	  in	  effect	  looking	  at	  one	  event,	  the	  colonization	  by	  a	  few	  European	  countries	  during	  a	  specific	  period	  in	  history,	  based	  on	  a	  specific	  ideology	  and	  a	  set	  of	  goals.	  Hence,	  they	  are	  comparing	  different	  countries’	  experiences	  within	  the	  set	  that	  was	  effectively	  colonized.	  Most	  of	  the	  other	  papers	  we	  cite	  in	  support	  of	  institutional	  persistence	  in	  the	  first	  section	  use	  different	  episodes	  of	  the	  same	  colonization	  era,	  so	  in	  a	  sense	  they	  make	  the	  same	  point:	  the	  actions	  of	  colonizers	  have	  long-­‐lasting	  influence.	  	  	  
Another	  key	  empirical	  issue	  is	  whether	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  the	  persistence	  is	  institutions.	  There	  are	  clearly	  some	  examples	  that	  give	  a	  central	  role	  to	  institutions.	  In	  particular,	  Banerjee	  and	  Iyer	  (2005),	  and	  Dell	  (2012)	  show	  that	  areas	  that	  started	  with	  the	  same	  culture	  before	  colonization,	  and	  in	  some	  ways	  even	  after	  (since	  they	  were	  colonized	  by	  the	  same	  people),	  have	  different	  outcomes	  today	  because	  of	  particular	  institutional	  choices	  made	  by	  the	  colonial	  powers.	  While	  culture	  was	  likely	  affected	  by	  these	  changes	  in	  institutions,	  and	  these	  cultural	  shifts	  may	  have	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  persistence	  of	  change,	  the	  main	  initial	  driver	  had	  to	  be	  the	  institutions.	  	  	  But	  these	  examples	  clearly	  do	  not	  rule	  out	  a	  more	  central	  role	  for	  culture	  in	  other	  examples.	  Glaeser	  et	  al.	  (2004)	  argue	  that	  nothing	  in	  AJR1	  tells	  us	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  settlement	  by	  the	  European	  powers	  is	  due	  to	  institutions,	  and	  not	  to	  something	  else.	  For	  example,	  early	  settler	  mortality	  and	  the	  resulting	  settlement	  patterns	  are	  also	  correlated	  with	  human	  capital	  that	  the	  settlers	  brought.	  Of	  course	  human	  capital	  investment	  is	  also	  influenced	  by	  the	  quality	  of	  institutions,	  so	  we	  are	  left	  with	  the	  riddle	  of	  whether	  the	  human	  capital	  of	  the	  settlers	  (their	  culture)	  is	  what	  drove	  the	  good	  institutions	  or	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  this	  debate	  can	  have	  any	  final	  resolution.	  	  	  	  Furthermore,	  even	  in	  some	  of	  the	  cases	  where	  a	  channel	  can	  clearly	  be	  established,	  it	  does	  not	  necessarily	  follow	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  consolidation	  of	  power	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  elite.	  For	  example,	  Banerjee	  and	  Iyer’s	  study	  shows	  that	  the	  system	  of	  tax	  revenue	  collection	  set	  up	  by	  the	  British	  in	  India	  continues	  to	  affect	  outcomes	  today.	  But	  the	  innovation	  that	  the	  British	  introduced	  was	  the	  individual-­‐responsibility	  system,	  not	  the	  pro-­‐elite	  zamindari	  system,	  which	  was	  the	  old	  Mughal	  system	  (although	  like	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Mughal	  Empire,	  it	  had	  crumbled	  away	  by	  the	  time	  the	  British	  colonized	  India).	  In	  this	  case,	  it	  is	  probably	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  the	  British	  made	  the	  system	  more	  inclusive	  by	  introducing	  the	  individual	  responsibility	  system,	  and	  
that	  persisted.8	  This	  stands	  in	  contrast	  to	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson’s	  model,	  since	  India	  was	  an	  area	  of	  high	  settler	  mortality	  area	  and	  there	  was	  relatively	  little	  direct	  settlement.	  	  In	  summary,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  pure	  culturalist	  view,	  which	  may	  be	  a	  bit	  of	  straw	  man,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  very	  little	  scope	  for	  using	  regression	  analysis	  to	  draw	  sharp	  distinctions	  between	  these	  theories.	  It	  is	  certainly	  the	  case	  that	  elites	  wield	  disproportionate	  power	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  culture	  does	  impose	  important	  constraint	  on	  what	  is	  possible;	  but	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  tell	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  these	  forces	  are	  dominant	  rather	  than	  merely	  being	  in	  contention	  with	  the	  forces	  of	  will	  and	  chance.	  Nor	  is	  it	  clear	  whether,	  even	  in	  the	  most	  ill-­‐favored	  places,	  we	  can	  be	  sure	  that	  the	  forces	  of	  politics	  or	  culture	  always	  act	  to	  strangle	  development.	  	  	  What	  is	  a	  pragmatist	  supposed	  to	  do,	  given	  that	  we	  cannot	  resolve	  this	  issue	  on	  purely	  empirical	  grounds?	  Should	  she	  or	  he	  give	  up	  trying	  to	  make	  things	  better	  because	  any	  effort	  could	  end	  up	  helping	  the	  bad	  guys?	  Or	  is	  the	  right	  approach	  the	  more	  naïve	  one	  where,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  you	  just	  act	  according	  to	  what	  you	  prima	  
facie	  think	  is	  right,	  without	  begin	  overly	  strategic?	  In	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  paper	  we	  offer	  some	  tentative	  thoughts	  suggesting	  that	  the	  naïve	  approach	  may	  be	  the	  right	  one,	  except	  in	  very	  special	  situations	  (say,	  where	  it	  is	  totally	  evident	  that	  you	  are	  playing	  into	  hands	  of	  the	  “bad	  guys”).	  	  We	  begin	  by	  observing	  that,	  contrary	  to	  what	  the	  rather	  fatalistic	  view	  of	  history	  that	  is	  a	  part	  of	  the	  modern	  revival	  of	  determinism	  would	  suggest,	  economic	  and	  social	  outcomes	  have	  been	  improving	  for	  most	  people	  in	  the	  world,	  including	  the	  poor	  in	  developing	  countries.	  The	  grip	  of	  the	  elites	  may	  not	  be	  nearly	  as	  tight	  as	  these	  theories	  hold.	  This	  view	  is	  reinforced	  by	  direct	  evidence	  that	  elites	  do	  not	  control	  all	  that	  much,	  as	  well	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  rather	  modest	  interventions	  into	  political	  institutions	  seem	  to	  be	  able	  to	  successfully	  and	  durably	  relax	  the	  grip	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  This	  is	  of	  course	  consistent	  with	  British	  colonization	  having	  been	  a	  disaster	  for	  India	  overall.	  	  	  	  
elites.	  An	  agenda	  that	  focuses	  on	  the	  identification	  and	  implementation	  of	  necessary	  reforms,	  both	  economic	  and	  political,	  therefore	  offers	  a	  possible	  way	  forward,	  the	  depredations	  of	  history	  notwithstanding.	  	  
3.1	  Outcomes	  have	  been	  improving	  (even	  in	  “bad”	  countries)	  
	  While	  many	  unfortunate	  things	  happened	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  warrant	  for	  the	  profound	  pessimism	  that	  the	  determinists	  bring	  with	  them.	  Kenny	  (2011)	  forcefully	  makes	  the	  case	  in	  his	  book,	  Getting	  better.	  	  	  Take	  infant	  mortality.	  Between	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1960s	  and	  beginning	  of	  the	  2000s,	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa’s	  disaster	  years,	  the	  years	  of	  rampant	  kleptocracies	  and	  murderous	  dictatorships	  that	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson	  write	  so	  eloquently	  about,	  infant	  mortality	  in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  fell	  by	  almost	  a	  third.	  Between	  1990-­‐2010,	  four	  of	  the	  five	  countries	  that	  showed	  the	  biggest	  absolute	  decline	  in	  infant	  mortality	  were	  in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  and	  they	  included	  two	  countries,	  Sierra	  Leone	  and	  Liberia,	  which	  had	  ongoing	  civil	  wars,	  and	  Nigeria,	  famous	  for	  both	  its	  rampant	  corruption	  and	  its	  recurrent	  insurgencies.9	  	  	  One	  possible	  response	  to	  these	  examples	  is	  that	  they	  are	  special	  because	  health	  is	  special.	  There	  is	  so	  much	  international	  action	  in	  health—vaccines	  are	  developed	  in	  the	  West	  and	  are	  then	  provided	  more	  or	  less	  free	  to	  poor	  people	  in	  poor	  countries	  through	  institutions	  like	  GAVI—that	  the	  national	  context	  does	  not	  matter.	  We	  don’t	  think	  that	  this	  is	  true.	  Having	  worked	  with	  government	  health	  bureaucracies	  in	  India,	  we	  know	  very	  well	  vaccine	  availability	  is	  only	  part	  of	  the	  game,	  but	  other	  examples	  might	  be	  more	  compelling.	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  interesting	  examples	  is	  what	  has	  happened	  to	  the	  Indian	  caste	  system,	  surely	  a	  canonical	  example	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  cultural	  and	  economic	  structures	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  http://www.mercatornet.com/demography/view/9694.	  	  	  
that	  elites	  build	  to	  sustain	  themselves	  in	  power.	  When	  India	  became	  independent	  lower	  castes—particularly	  the	  former	  “untouchables”	  who	  came	  to	  be	  called	  the	  “scheduled	  castes”	  (“SCs”)	  and	  the	  “Scheduled	  Tribes”	  (“STs”)	  after	  the	  schedule	  of	  the	  Indian	  constitution	  where	  they	  were	  listed—were	  hugely	  disadvantaged	  in	  all	  possible	  respects:	  education,	  occupations,	  access	  to	  public	  goods,	  access	  to	  positions	  of	  power.	  The	  Indian	  constitution	  recognized	  this	  historical	  discrimination	  and	  over	  the	  years,	  especially	  starting	  in	  the	  1970s,	  the	  state	  adopted	  a	  rhetoric	  of	  universal	  access	  to	  public	  goods	  and	  the	  elimination	  of	  poverty,	  and	  put	  in	  places	  affirmative	  action	  policies	  to	  try	  to	  improve	  the	  access	  of	  SCs	  and	  STs	  to	  education,	  employment,	  and	  political	  positions.	  These	  policies	  are	  still	  in	  place	  today,	  which	  may	  suggest	  that	  they	  have	  dramatically	  failed.	  	  	  But	  in	  fact,	  India	  has	  been	  characterized	  by	  a	  fairly	  rapid	  convergence	  of	  the	  economic	  fortunes	  of	  these	  groups	  (Hnatkovska,	  Lahiri	  and	  Paul,	  2012).	  There	  was	  both	  a	  significant	  convergence	  in	  years	  of	  education	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  and	  median	  wage	  premium	  of	  non-­‐SC/STs	  relative	  to	  SC/STs	  has	  declined	  from	  36	  percent	  in	  1983	  to	  21	  percent	  in	  2004–2005	  (while	  the	  black-­‐white	  wage	  premium	  in	  the	  US	  seems	  steady	  around	  35	  percent).	  There	  was	  significant	  convergence	  in	  consumption	  level	  as	  well.	  The	  authors	  estimate	  that	  the	  convergence	  in	  education	  levels,	  which	  was	  probably	  at	  least	  in	  part	  due	  to	  aggressive	  affirmative	  action	  policies,	  explain	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  decline	  in	  the	  wage	  premium.	  This	  was	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  broad	  overall	  decline	  in	  poverty,	  which	  means	  that	  absolute	  levels	  also	  went	  up	  substantially	  for	  all	  these	  groups.	  	  	  This	  evidence	  is	  complemented	  by	  evidence	  on	  public	  good	  access.	  Using	  data	  on	  500	  parliamentary	  constituencies	  from	  Indian	  censuses,	  Banerjee	  and	  Somanathan	  (2007)	  shows	  that	  there	  was	  a	  strong	  convergence	  in	  access	  to	  public	  goods	  between	  1971	  and	  1991.	  In	  1971,	  areas	  with	  a	  concentration	  of	  SCs	  and	  STs	  did	  worse	  across	  all	  types	  of	  goods.	  By	  1991,	  there	  was	  a	  dramatic	  expansion	  in	  rural	  infrastructure,	  primarily	  benefitting	  the	  areas	  that	  started	  at	  a	  lower	  point,	  in	  particular	  areas	  with	  lot	  of	  SCs.	  This	  is	  not	  just	  a	  mechanical	  effect	  of	  universal	  
coverage,	  as	  the	  coverage	  is	  still	  far	  from	  universal	  for	  a	  number	  of	  the	  public	  goods	  they	  consider,	  and	  the	  convergence	  is	  observed	  in	  those	  as	  well.	  The	  authors	  argue	  that	  this	  convergence	  is	  a	  result	  of	  the	  pledge	  of	  universal	  access	  the	  state	  made	  in	  the	  early	  1970s,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  important	  realignment	  of	  the	  political	  influence	  of	  these	  groups.	  	  	  The	  point	  is	  not	  that	  the	  influence	  of	  caste	  has	  completely	  gone	  away.	  Banerjee	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  find,	  for	  example,	  that	  caste-­‐based	  preferences	  are	  still	  a	  very	  strong	  influence	  on	  who	  marries	  whom.10	  However	  unlike	  in	  the	  past,	  what	  is	  valued	  is	  not	  marrying	  up	  in	  the	  caste	  hierarchy,	  but	  rather	  marrying	  within	  one’s	  own	  caste.	  Caste	  has	  become	  a	  form	  of	  identity	  that	  its	  holders	  proudly	  proclaim.	  This	  has	  had	  profound	  and	  not	  necessarily	  always	  desirable	  consequences	  for	  politics	  in	  India.	  Banerjee	  and	  Pande	  (2009)	  present	  a	  case	  study	  for	  the	  Indian	  State	  of	  Uttar	  Pradesh	  (UP),	  home	  to	  166	  million	  people.	  At	  Independence,	  the	  Congress	  Party	  dominated	  UP	  politics,	  and	  it	  had	  mostly	  an	  upper-­‐caste	  leadership	  (Jaffrelot,	  2003).	  The	  congress	  hegemony	  was	  more	  or	  less	  unchallenged	  until	  after	  1984,	  and	  up	  to	  that	  point	  the	  main	  opposition	  parties	  were	  also	  upper-­‐caste	  dominated—there	  were	  SC	  legislators,	  but	  they	  typically	  ran	  in	  seats	  reserved	  for	  SCs.	  Things	  started	  changing	  in	  the	  1980s.	  In	  1984,	  an	  SC	  party,	  the	  BSP,	  was	  formed.	  The	  party’s	  rhetoric	  emphasized	  the	  caste	  difference	  and	  used	  evidence	  of	  elite	  dominance	  as	  an	  argument	  to	  win	  support	  (“the	  rule	  of	  the	  15%	  over	  the	  85%	  cannot	  last”).	  A	  second	  low-­‐caste	  party	  was	  formed	  in	  1992.	  Since	  then	  one	  of	  the	  two	  parties,	  or	  sometimes	  both,	  have	  been	  a	  part	  of	  the	  UP	  state	  government.	  In	  1995,	  a	  low	  caste-­‐woman,	  Mayawati,	  became	  Chief	  Minister	  of	  UP.	  	  	  The	  rise	  of	  the	  low-­‐caste	  parties	  and	  the	  “ethnicization”	  of	  politics	  in	  UP	  is	  not	  necessarily	  only	  (or	  at	  all)	  a	  good	  thing.	  Banerjee	  and	  Pande	  argue	  that	  this	  went	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  However	  they	  also	  show	  that	  because	  the	  caste	  groups	  are	  broad	  enough	  and	  caste-­‐based	  inequality	  has	  declined,	  there	  is	  essentially	  everyone	  you	  might	  have	  marred	  within	  your	  caste	  group.	  As	  a	  result,	  although	  the	  willingness	  to	  pay	  to	  marry	  within	  caste	  is	  very	  high,	  the	  preference	  for	  within-­‐caste	  marriage	  essentially	  does	  not	  affect	  who	  marries	  whom	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  other	  characteristics.	  
along	  with	  a	  lowering	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  candidates	  in	  places	  where	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  numerical	  dominance	  of	  one	  group	  of	  the	  other.	  This	  takes	  the	  rather	  extreme	  form	  of	  very	  corrupt	  or	  even	  convicted	  criminals	  able	  to	  run	  for	  and	  win	  elections.	  The	  point	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  any	  more	  to	  say	  that	  a	  traditional	  elite	  group	  is	  running	  UP	  (formally	  or	  informally).	  This	  has	  been	  replaced	  by	  a	  very	  competitive,	  if	  sometimes	  dysfunctional,	  political	  system.	  	  	  Elsewhere	  in	  India	  there	  are	  definite	  signs	  of	  an	  erosion	  of	  traditional	  authority	  in	  local	  politics.	  When	  the	  nationwide	  workfare	  program	  “NREGA”	  was	  launched	  in	  2005,	  many	  were	  worried	  that	  it	  would	  be	  captured	  by	  powerful	  local	  elites,	  who	  would	  now	  find	  it	  worthwhile	  to	  win	  control	  over	  local	  governments	  in	  order	  to	  control	  the	  jobs	  program	  and	  extract	  both	  economic	  and	  political	  rents.	  In	  fact,	  in	  Rajasthan	  Banerjee	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  document	  remarkably	  low	  incumbency	  rates	  among	  local	  politicians	  post	  NREGA.	  46%	  of	  those	  who	  are	  eligible	  to	  run	  for	  election	  run	  again	  and	  only	  6%	  are	  elected.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  chance	  for	  an	  incumbent	  who	  choses	  to	  run	  to	  be	  reelected	  is	  almost	  exactly	  the	  same	  as	  the	  chances	  of	  any	  other	  candidate	  in	  the	  election	  (in	  a	  average	  election	  there	  are	  about	  seven	  candidates).	  Furthermore,	  a	  very	  simple	  pre-­‐election	  campaign	  emphasizing	  the	  importance	  of	  picking	  good	  candidates	  as	  local	  representatives	  and	  their	  role	  in	  the	  good	  functioning	  of	  the	  program	  reduced	  the	  incumbents’	  probability	  to	  run	  again	  from	  46%	  to	  19%	  and	  their	  probability	  of	  winning	  to	  just	  3%.	  This	  is	  almost	  the	  opposite	  of	  a	  state	  of	  rampant	  local	  elite	  capture:	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  not	  enough	  elite	  persistence	  in	  this	  context!	  	  	  	  India	  is,	  of	  course,	  just	  one	  country,	  albeit	  a	  very	  large	  one.	  But	  the	  evidence	  of	  change	  is	  everywhere.	  Bangladesh,	  a	  poor	  Islamic	  country	  with	  many	  of	  the	  anti-­‐girl	  prejudices	  shared	  across	  much	  of	  South	  Asia,	  where	  in	  1971	  only	  11%	  of	  women	  were	  literate	  compared	  to	  25%	  of	  men,	  now	  has	  a	  higher	  proportion	  of	  girls	  in	  secondary	  school	  than	  boys	  (Hussain	  and	  Naumi,	  2010).	  	  	  
Another	  particularly	  interesting	  example	  is	  the	  decline	  in	  inequality	  in	  Latin	  America	  over	  the	  last	  10	  years	  (Lustig,	  Lopez-­‐Calva	  and	  Ortiz-­‐Juarez,	  2013).	  Overall	  the	  Gini	  coefficient	  (a	  standard	  measure	  of	  inequality),	  declined	  from	  0.530	  to	  0.497	  in	  the	  region	  while	  it	  was	  increasing	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  it	  declined	  in	  13	  of	  the	  17	  countries	  for	  which	  they	  have	  reasonable	  comparable	  data.	  Since	  Latin	  America	  is	  one	  of	  the	  “poster	  children”	  for	  the	  narrative	  of	  inequality	  fueled	  by	  poor	  governance	  and	  elite	  capture,	  this	  is	  particularly	  telling.	  Looking	  in	  detailed	  at	  the	  case	  studies	  for	  three	  countries	  (Argentina,	  Brazil	  and	  Mexico),	  the	  authors	  attribute	  the	  decline	  in	  inequality	  both	  to	  a	  decline	  in	  the	  premium	  on	  skilled	  labor	  and	  to	  redistributive	  policies.	  Mexico	  was	  the	  leader	  in	  establishing	  the	  very	  popular	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  programs,	  and	  Brazil	  has	  a	  successful	  one	  as	  well.	  11	  	  Of	  course,	  we	  are	  ignoring	  the	  counterfactual	  here.	  Things	  could	  have	  surely	  improved	  even	  more.	  But	  it	  is	  striking	  that	  these	  profound	  shifts	  can	  happen—the	  caste	  system	  transforms	  itself,	  females	  surpass	  males	  in	  education	  in	  an	  Islamic	  society,	  infant	  mortality	  drops	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  civil	  wars—without	  the	  apparent	  protection	  of	  good	  institutions	  or	  helpful	  cultures.	  	  
3.2	  And	  elites	  don’t	  always	  capture	  (that	  much)	  
	  In	  Indonesia	  Alatas	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  study	  the	  extent	  of	  elite	  capture	  in	  targeted	  transfer	  programs.	  They	  use	  data	  from	  400	  villages	  on	  who	  were	  the	  beneficiaries	  of	  three	  programs—a	  cash	  transfer,	  a	  transfer	  program	  that	  offers	  subsidized	  rice	  and	  a	  health	  insurance	  program—and	  show	  that	  while	  the	  formal	  village	  elites	  (i.e.	  elected	  representatives,	  etc.)	  do	  favor	  their	  relatives	  in	  the	  allocation	  of	  these	  programs,	  the	  net	  welfare	  loss	  is	  very	  small	  (less	  than	  2%	  of	  the	  loss	  from	  using	  the	  bad	  quality	  data	  that	  the	  government	  uses	  to	  target).	  The	  reason	  is	  that	  the	  elites	  favor	  just	  a	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  Of	  course,	  this	  does	  not	  imply	  there	  are	  no	  issues	  left	  in	  Latin	  America	  or	  in	  these	  three	  countries	  in	  particular.	  The	  recent	  discontent	  in	  Brazil	  showed	  that	  even	  the	  apparent	  success	  of	  the	  Lula-­‐led	  policies	  combining	  economic	  reform	  with	  redistributions	  is	  much	  more	  fragile	  than	  might	  have	  been	  believed.	  	  	  
few	  people	  and	  these	  people	  tend	  to	  be	  pretty	  close	  to	  the	  poverty	  line.	  These	  results	  were	  confirmed	  by	  the	  outcome	  of	  an	  experiment	  where	  the	  elites	  where	  given	  free	  rein	  to	  decide	  who	  would	  get	  some	  quite	  large	  ($150	  a	  year	  per	  household	  for	  six	  years)	  cash	  transfers.	  	  	  The	  point	  is	  not	  that	  these	  elites	  are	  particularly	  honest—as	  Olken	  (2007)	  shows,	  they	  are	  quite	  happy	  to	  steal	  from	  the	  government’s	  road	  construction	  projects.	  However,	  radically	  altering	  the	  distribution	  of	  social	  transfers	  (as	  against	  favoring	  their	  near-­‐poor	  relatives)	  is	  perhaps	  not	  in	  their	  interest.	  	  	  This	  result	  is	  important	  because	  Alatas	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  also	  found	  that	  the	  potential	  beneficiary	  communities	  for	  these	  transfers	  much	  prefer	  the	  elite	  to	  be	  doing	  the	  allocation	  over	  the	  government	  bureaucracy,	  and	  the	  evidence	  that	  they	  are	  not	  somehow	  being	  hoodwinked	  by	  the	  elites	  makes	  this	  all	  the	  more	  attractive.	  	  	  
3.3	  Politics	  (and	  culture)	  can	  change	  too	  	  	  In	  the	  determinist’s	  world,	  politics	  and	  culture	  change	  at	  their	  own	  pace.	  There	  is,	  however,	  growing	  evidence	  that	  relatively	  modest	  interventions	  can	  have	  quite	  an	  immediate	  impact	  on	  political	  outcomes	  and	  cultural	  attitudes.	  This	  can	  be	  very	  important	  if	  we	  live	  in	  world	  where	  change	  does	  not	  happen	  because	  of	  inertia,	  because	  then	  we	  would	  expect	  those	  beneficial	  effects	  to	  persist	  for	  the	  same	  reason	  and,	  moreover,	  such	  interventions	  could	  set	  off	  a	  positive	  dynamic	  that	  could	  make	  a	  large	  difference	  in	  the	  long	  term.	  	  	  A	  first	  class	  of	  such	  interventions	  focuses	  on	  the	  mechanics	  of	  voting.	  At	  least	  two	  studies	  show	  that	  they	  can	  have	  important	  impacts.	  Fujiwara	  (2012)	  studies	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  introduction	  of	  electronic	  ballots	  in	  Brazil.	  Electronic	  ballots	  were	  primarily	  introduced	  to	  help	  counting	  votes	  more	  rapidly,	  but	  they	  had	  an	  additional,	  perhaps	  unintended,	  impact.	  The	  paper	  ballot	  required	  the	  voter	  to	  copy	  down	  the	  number	  of	  a	  particular	  candidate	  on	  to	  the	  ballot.	  This	  led	  to	  many	  errors	  
and	  invalid	  ballots.	  Using	  two	  regression-­‐discontinuity	  designs	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  originally	  only	  large	  municipalities	  were	  selected	  for	  the	  reform,	  Fujiwara	  shows	  that	  the	  electronic	  process,	  which	  offered	  immediate	  validation	  of	  one’s	  choice,	  greatly	  reduced	  the	  number	  of	  invalid	  ballots.	  Since	  the	  invalid	  ballots	  were	  more	  frequent	  among	  the	  poor	  and	  illiterate,	  the	  reform	  changed	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  actual	  electorate,	  and	  of	  the	  people	  elected:	  in	  areas	  that	  gained	  more	  valid	  votes	  the	  elected	  representative	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  less	  educated	  themselves	  (which	  probably	  indicates	  that	  they	  represent	  the	  poor).	  In	  those	  municipalities,	  spending	  decisions	  and	  health	  outcomes	  were	  also	  affected:	  more	  was	  spent	  on	  public	  health	  care	  (a	  clearly	  pro-­‐poor	  expenditure	  in	  Brazil)	  and	  pregnant	  women	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  seek	  prenatal	  care.	  	  	  Callen	  and	  Long	  (2013)	  set	  up	  a	  randomized	  experiment	  to	  try	  to	  prevent	  fraud	  at	  the	  stage	  of	  adding	  up	  of	  votes	  in	  Afghanistan.	  To	  measure	  fraud	  in	  the	  2010	  election	  they	  made	  sure	  that	  at	  each	  voting	  station,	  the	  provisional	  vote	  tally	  sheet	  was	  photographed,	  and	  then	  compared	  it	  to	  the	  reported	  total	  for	  this	  station.	  They	  found	  that	  fraud	  at	  the	  adding	  stage	  was	  rampant:	  there	  were	  differences	  in	  78%	  of	  the	  471	  polling	  stations	  in	  their	  sample,	  and	  candidates	  connected	  to	  officials	  in	  charge	  of	  doing	  the	  adding	  received	  a	  disproportionate	  share	  of	  the	  fraudulent	  votes.	  In	  addition,	  the	  authors	  implemented	  a	  randomized	  experiment	  to	  discourage	  fraud:	  in	  a	  randomly	  selected	  subset	  of	  the	  polling	  stations,	  they	  sent	  a	  letter	  in	  advance	  announcing	  that	  the	  comparison	  using	  the	  photos	  would	  be	  done.	  They	  found	  that	  the	  intervention	  reduced	  aggregation	  fraud	  considerably,	  and	  that	  the	  loss	  of	  votes	  was	  for	  politically	  connected	  candidates	  was	  disproportional	  (they	  lost	  about	  25%	  of	  their	  “votes”).	  Candidates	  connected	  to	  the	  officials	  in	  charge	  of	  aggregation	  in	  their	  constituency	  also	  lost	  votes	  disproportionally.	  	  	  	  A	  second	  class	  of	  interventions	  focuses	  on	  voter	  mobilization	  behind	  the	  broad	  message	  of	  respecting	  the	  spirit	  of	  democracy.	  Several	  studies,	  based	  on	  randomly	  assigned	  interventions,	  have	  shown	  that	  this	  can	  influence	  the	  way	  people	  behave	  
and	  vote.	  Banerjee,	  Green,	  Green	  and	  Pande	  (2009)	  show	  that	  in	  Uttar	  Pradesh,	  puppet	  shows	  and	  public	  meetings	  encouraging	  people	  to	  vote	  on	  issues	  rather	  than	  caste	  reduced	  caste-­‐based	  voting	  by	  nearly	  15%.	  Collier	  and	  Vicente	  (2011)	  show	  that	  a	  campaign	  against	  political	  violence	  in	  Nigeria	  did	  reduce	  reported	  incidents	  of	  violence	  and	  affected	  the	  way	  people	  claim	  to	  vote.	  Aker,	  Collier	  and	  Vicente	  (2010)	  show	  that	  in	  Mozambique,	  sending	  voters	  SMS	  on	  their	  rights	  before	  the	  elections	  increased	  voter	  turnout.	  Fujiwara	  and	  Wantchekon	  (2013)	  find	  that	  in	  Benin,	  encouraging	  discussions	  over	  a	  concrete	  “public	  goods”	  framework	  brings	  in	  more	  votes	  than	  a	  traditional	  clientelistic	  message,	  at	  least	  for	  the	  candidates	  that	  are	  not	  dominant	  in	  a	  particular	  constituency.	  All	  of	  these	  experiments,	  conducted	  in	  very	  different	  settings	  (from	  a	  well	  established	  democracy	  in	  India	  to	  much	  more	  unstable	  contexts	  in	  Mozambique	  and	  Nigeria),	  suggest	  that	  specific	  interventions	  can	  make	  democracy	  work	  better.	  	  A	  third	  class	  of	  intervention	  seeks	  to	  affect	  voting	  outcomes	  by	  improving	  voter	  information.	  Voters	  in	  developing	  countries	  often	  very	  little	  information	  about	  their	  candidates,	  partly	  because	  there	  is	  relatively	  little	  local	  media	  and	  many	  people	  do	  not	  have	  access	  to	  what	  media	  there	  is	  since	  a	  lot	  of	  them	  do	  not	  own	  televisions	  and	  are	  not	  comfortable	  reading.	  Banerjee,	  Green,	  Green	  and	  Pande	  (2009),	  in	  the	  study	  mentioned	  above,	  hypothesize	  that	  the	  reason	  why	  many	  people	  vote	  on	  caste	  lines	  is	  not	  so	  much	  that	  they	  have	  strong	  pro-­‐caste	  preferences,	  but	  that	  they	  have	  so	  little	  other	  reliable	  information	  about	  the	  candidates	  to	  go	  on.	  At	  least	  caste	  is	  something	  they	  know.	  	  	  Given	  this,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  informational	  interventions	  not	  only	  affect	  turnout,	  but	  also	  how	  people	  vote.	  Ferraz	  and	  Finan	  (2008)	  study	  the	  impact	  of	  corruption	  audits	  in	  Brazil.	  Municipalities	  are	  randomly	  selected	  every	  so	  often	  to	  receive	  a	  thorough	  audit	  of	  their	  finances.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  audits	  are	  shared	  with	  the	  media	  and	  generally	  widely	  publicized.	  Ferraz	  and	  Finan	  compare	  vote	  shares	  for	  the	  incumbent	  in	  municipalities	  where	  irregularities	  were	  found	  to	  those	  for	  the	  incumbent	  where	  none	  were	  found.	  If	  the	  audit	  was	  held	  just	  after	  the	  election,	  
there	  is	  no	  difference.	  But	  if	  the	  audit	  was	  held	  just	  before	  the	  election,	  the	  incumbent	  got	  many	  more	  votes	  in	  municipalities	  that	  had	  not	  had	  seen	  irregularities.	  This	  shows	  that	  voters	  were	  able	  (and	  willing)	  to	  punish	  corrupt	  politicians	  when	  they	  had	  the	  information.	  Banerjee,	  Kumar,	  Pande	  and	  Su	  (2010)	  find	  that	  giving	  voters	  information	  about	  their	  legislators’	  official	  performance	  (attendance	  rate	  at	  committee	  meetings,	  etc.)	  through	  newspaper	  report	  cards	  helps	  candidates	  who	  did	  their	  job	  relative	  to	  those	  who	  did	  not.	  The	  Aker,	  Collier	  and	  Vicente	  (2010)	  paper	  mentioned	  above	  had	  a	  treatment	  where	  a	  free	  newspaper	  was	  distributed	  to	  the	  voters,	  and	  also	  found	  that	  increased	  accountability	  votes.12	  	  	  	  
4.	  In	  conclusion:	  what	  does	  all	  this	  add	  up	  to?	  	  For	  determinists	  all	  this	  good	  news	  exists	  precisely	  because	  it	  does	  not	  matter.	  If	  the	  ruling	  elite	  (or	  the	  dominant	  culture)	  has	  permitted	  change	  to	  happen	  it	  is	  precisely	  because	  it	  not	  worth	  their	  while	  to	  fight	  it.	  This	  is	  somewhat	  equivalent	  to	  the	  Bauer’s	  paradox	  on	  foreign	  aid	  (the	  only	  places	  where	  you	  can	  effectively	  give	  aid	  are	  the	  places	  where	  they	  don’t	  really	  need	  it).	  In	  this	  view,	  if	  the	  upper	  castes	  in	  India	  consent	  to	  allow	  the	  lower	  castes	  access	  to	  education,	  it	  is	  probably	  because	  they	  know	  that	  they	  won’t	  win	  the	  fight	  to	  keep	  it	  from	  them;	  if	  the	  elites	  in	  Indonesia	  choose	  to	  not	  steal	  too	  much	  from	  antipoverty	  programs,	  it	  is	  probably	  because	  they	  have	  bigger	  fish	  to	  fry;	  the	  campaign	  in	  Nigeria	  might	  have	  discouraged	  electoral	  violence	  as	  a	  part	  of	  some	  local	  experiment,	  but	  if	  it	  was	  done	  on	  nationwide	  scale	  and	  the	  ruling	  elite	  really	  needed	  violence	  to	  perpetuate	  its	  hold	  on	  power,	  the	  campaign	  would	  have	  probably	  been	  shut	  down.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  All	  these	  studies	  involve	  media	  as	  a	  way	  to	  diffuse	  the	  information,	  and	  this	  connects	  their	  results	  to	  a	  much	  larger	  literature	  on	  the	  role	  of	  media	  in	  democracies,	  which	  is	  surveyed	  by	  Prat	  and	  Stromberg	  (2010).	  While	  this	  literature	  is	  mainly	  focused	  on	  rich	  countries,	  its	  conclusions	  are	  very	  much	  in	  line	  with	  those	  few	  experiments.	  According	  to	  Prat	  and	  Stromberg,	  three	  general	  results	  emerge:	  (1)	  media	  scrutiny	  increases	  political	  accountability	  and	  appears	  to	  improve	  policy	  (with	  a	  potential	  caveat	  on	  multitasking);	  (2)	  media	  capture	  is	  a	  problem,	  but	  media	  pluralism	  and	  commercial	  motives	  are	  a	  defense	  against	  it;	  (3)	  voter	  information	  and	  voting	  outcomes	  are	  affected	  by	  the	  media.	  This	  opens	  a	  vast	  territory	  for	  possible	  intervention	  in	  politics	  that	  focuses	  not	  directly	  on	  elections	  but	  on	  the	  conditions	  that	  are	  necessary	  to	  maintain	  a	  robust	  media	  culture.	  	  	  
	  The	  example	  of	  the	  voting	  machines	  in	  Brazil	  is	  somewhat	  reassuring	  in	  this	  respect:	  after	  all,	  even	  though	  the	  machines	  de	  facto	  re-­‐enfranchised	  a	  substantial	  fraction	  of	  the	  poor,	  there	  was	  no	  attempt	  to	  cancel	  the	  reform.	  Likewise,	  there	  is	  no	  report	  in	  the	  many	  papers	  that	  we	  have	  just	  reviewed	  of	  the	  elite	  trying	  to	  derail	  the	  experiment,	  even	  when	  the	  interventions	  were	  run	  on	  a	  scale	  large	  enough	  to	  actually	  influence	  electoral	  outcomes.	  	  Nevertheless	  there	  is	  always	  the	  concern	  that	  the	  elites	  only	  let	  such	  reforms	  happen	  when	  they	  don’t	  really	  matter	  to	  them.	  If	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  should	  we,	  as	  social	  scientists,	  hold	  back	  from	  proposing	  any	  policy	  change	  because	  only	  the	  ones	  that	  the	  elites	  can	  benefit	  from	  will	  survive?	  Should	  we	  refrain,	  because	  action	  just	  helps	  them	  consolidate	  their	  hold	  on	  power?	  13	  	  We	  disagree	  with	  this	  argument	  in	  favor	  of	  passivity	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  First,	  it	  overestimates	  the	  intellectual	  sophistication	  of	  the	  elites	  in	  two	  different	  ways:	  First,	  it	  assumes	  that	  anything	  that	  is	  in	  collective	  interest	  of	  the	  elites	  and	  more	  or	  less	  everyone	  else,	  is	  necessarily	  already	  being	  considered	  and,	  if	  feasible,	  already	  implemented;	  and	  second	  it	  assumes	  that	  the	  elites	  always	  understand	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  economic	  and	  political	  system	  well	  enough	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  any	  opportunities	  to	  advance	  their	  interest—otherwise	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  could	  take	  advantage	  of	  it	  is	  not	  enough.	  Our	  sense	  of	  the	  elite	  leadership	  in	  most	  developing	  countries,	  based	  on	  personal	  experience	  as	  well	  as	  our	  reading	  of	  history,	  makes	  us	  skeptical	  of	  both	  parts	  of	  this	  first	  claim.	  Second,	  it	  ignores	  the	  fact	  that	  elites	  are	  typically	  not	  a	  homogenous	  group:	  India,	  Pakistan	  and	  Indonesia	  are	  all	  countries	  where	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  have	  seen	  an	  ongoing	  conflict	  between	  the	  modernizing	  elites	  and	  their	  more	  traditionalist	  elite	  opponents.	  There	  are,	  of	  course,	  attempts	  by	  single	  groups	  within	  the	  elite	  to	  take	  over	  and	  establish	  a	  single-­‐minded	  oligarchy,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  easy;	  and	  to	  make	  matters	  worse	  (for	  the	  oligarchs)	  the	  non-­‐elites	  can	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson	  (2013)	  seem	  to	  be	  worried	  about	  exactly	  this	  issue.	  
take	  advantage	  of	  the	  intra-­‐elite	  competition	  to	  advance	  their	  own	  agenda	  (Bardhan,	  1999).	  Finally	  it	  assumes	  that	  the	  elites	  are	  always	  forward-­‐looking—that	  they	  do	  not	  compromise	  the	  interests	  of	  future	  elites	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  their	  own.	  	  	  To	  take	  the	  example	  that	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson	  (2000)	  have	  made	  famous,	  that	  the	  Western	  elite	  extended	  the	  franchise	  because	  it	  was	  the	  best	  way	  to	  head	  off	  a	  revolution:	  what	  makes	  us	  believe	  that	  at	  that	  time	  they	  exactly	  understood	  that	  democracy	  would	  eventually	  lead	  to	  high	  taxes	  and	  social	  democracy,	  or	  even	  that	  they	  cared	  about	  what	  would	  happen	  in	  the	  distant	  future?	  Perhaps	  they	  just	  assumed,	  potentially	  incorrectly,	  that	  they	  would	  retain	  their	  control	  and	  manage	  to	  forestall	  all	  attempts	  for	  real	  social	  change.	  (After	  all,	  this	  is	  what	  happens	  in	  third-­‐world	  democracies,	  according	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson.)	  Should	  the	  egalitarian	  social	  scientists	  of	  the	  day	  have	  assumed	  that	  the	  elite	  always	  knows	  what	  it’s	  doing	  and	  it	  must	  be	  in	  their	  own	  self-­‐interest,	  and	  therefore	  resisted	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  franchise,	  or	  at	  least	  considered	  it	  to	  be	  irrelevant?	  	  Or,	  to	  take	  another	  example,	  when	  Suharto	  decided	  to	  massively	  expand	  access	  to	  education	  in	  Indonesia	  in	  1970s,	  did	  he	  consider	  the	  possibility	  that	  this	  would	  change	  people’s	  expectations	  and	  potentially	  contribute	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  country	  where	  his	  kind	  of	  dictators	  would	  be	  less	  welcome?	  Or	  did	  he	  assume	  that	  the	  control	  of	  the	  education	  system,	  the	  diffusion	  of	  the	  Pancasila	  ideology,	  and	  therefore	  the	  grip	  over	  the	  hearts	  and	  minds	  of	  the	  people	  would	  allow	  him	  to	  extend	  his	  control	  over	  the	  population?	  Should	  the	  liberal-­‐minded	  Indonesian	  of	  the	  1970s	  have	  fought	  to	  stop	  the	  school	  construction	  or	  supported	  them	  as	  a	  good	  cause?	  	  The	  point	  is	  not	  that	  elites	  do	  not	  hatch	  elaborate	  conspiracies	  to	  defraud	  the	  people,	  but	  they	  also	  make	  strategic	  errors	  and	  even	  act—perhaps	  only	  rarely,	  but	  perhaps	  not—out	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  national	  interest.	  Given	  that,	  we	  feel	  that	  while	  there	  are	  specific	  cases	  where	  a	  strategic	  silence	  may	  be	  warranted,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  society	  would	  	  not	  benefit	  from	  our	  systematic	  double-­‐guessing	  the	  intentions	  of	  the	  
elite	  (or	  strategizing	  against	  the	  dominant	  culture).	  We	  believe	  that	  as	  economists	  our	  main	  job	  remains	  to	  stick	  up	  for	  policies	  that,	  based	  on	  our	  economic	  analysis,	  are	  expected	  to	  help	  improve	  the	  efficiency	  of	  governments	  and	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  population	  everywhere—and	  to	  do	  so	  delineating	  with	  as	  much	  clarity	  as	  possible	  where	  we	  are	  speaking	  of	  what	  we	  objectively	  know,	  and	  where	  we	  are	  giving	  way	  to	  our	  private	  political	  or	  social	  preferences.	  	  	  
That	  does	  not	  at	  all	  mean	  that	  we	  should	  ignore	  institutions	  (or	  culture	  or	  politics)	  
when	  we	  make	  such	  policy	  recommendations.	  What	  we	  mean	  by	  economic	  analysis	  is	  not	  the	  naïve	  analysis	  that	  starts	  with	  an	  infinitely	  capable	  and	  benign	  state	  and	  a	  culture-­‐free	  understanding	  of	  the	  population.	  We	  have	  in	  mind	  an	  analysis	  that	  takes	  both	  institutions	  and	  cultures	  very	  seriously,	  but	  does	  not	  focus	  just	  on	  the	  Institutions	  with	  a	  capital	  I	  (or	  Culture	  with	  a	  capital	  C),	  that	  is	  to	  say	  a	  few	  macro	  indicators	  of	  institutional	  quality	  (or	  “culture”)	  that	  tell	  you	  whether	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  a	  “good”	  state	  or	  a	  “bad”	  one.	  While	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  know	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  corruption	  in	  a	  particular	  country	  (a	  macro	  indicator)	  because	  it	  tells	  us	  what	  to	  worry	  about,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  even	  more	  useful	  to	  know	  about	  specific	  capabilities	  of	  specific	  institutions	  or	  groups	  of	  people—say,	  whether	  a	  particular	  bureaucracy	  (the	  health	  workers	  or	  the	  police)	  within	  a	  country	  is	  particularly	  corrupt	  or	  inept	  or	  hostile	  to	  outsiders	  bearing	  messages	  of	  reform;	  or,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  especially	  open	  minded	  (we	  had	  such	  an	  experience	  with	  the	  police	  department	  in	  the	  State	  of	  Rajasthan).	  This	  is,	  after	  all,	  the	  information	  that	  can	  help	  the	  policymaker	  pick	  his	  targets	  better.	  	  	  Even	  at	  the	  macro	  level,	  our	  inclination	  is	  to	  be	  eclectic	  about	  the	  choice	  of	  indicators.	  Rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  one	  preeminent	  political	  constraint—e.g.	  the	  extent	  of	  checks	  on	  the	  executive—we	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  much	  to	  be	  gained	  by	  a	  range	  of	  indicators	  reflecting,	  for	  example,	  the	  quality	  of	  human	  capital	  in	  the	  bureaucracy	  or	  the	  way	  it	  is	  organized.	  (Are	  the	  bureaucrats	  specialists	  or	  generalists,	  professionals	  or	  political	  appointees;	  or	  simply	  how	  much	  resources	  are	  available	  to	  the	  bureaucracy?	  There	  are	  many	  more	  judges	  per	  capita	  in	  OECD	  
countries,	  for	  example.)	  As	  Besley	  and	  Persson,	  who	  focus	  on	  the	  very	  closely	  related	  notion	  of	  fiscal	  and	  legal	  capacity,	  point	  out,	  a	  country	  like	  India,	  which	  does	  very	  well	  on	  constraints	  on	  the	  executives,	  does	  much	  worse	  on	  fiscal	  and	  legal	  capacity,	  which	  might	  explain	  some	  of	  the	  problems	  it	  is	  facing	  in	  raising	  taxes,	  enforcing	  policies	  and	  fighting	  corruption.	  	  	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  choice	  facing	  the	  field	  of	  political	  economy	  is	  very	  simple.	  It	  can	  embrace	  grand	  theories	  that	  will	  offer	  us	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  strong	  and	  simple	  answers.	  Or	  it	  can	  try	  to	  be	  useful.	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